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I. INTRODUCrION

A bank's most ancient, basic functions include protection
of valuable property and facilitation of commerce. In the early
Renaissance, Italian banking families kept money and treasure
secure from the risks of the day and provided letters of credit to
travelling merchants. As the United States grew into a financial
power, the Morgans and the Mellons and the Chases used state-ofthe-art security measures to guard the nation's riches and created
cutting-edge financial strategies to sate the nation's insatiable
hunger for manufactured goods and transportation networks.
Now the global economy demands a staggering array of
commercial facilitation services from financial service companies:
funding the fabrication and information economy, lubricating
worldwide hyper-efficient instant-access marketplaces, liberating
capital to endow new ideas, and democratizing access to
sophisticated instruments.
But security demands on these
companies have also exploded in size and complexity.
The Medici guarded against bandits, pirates, wars, greedy
lords, and even the church, by using tools of protection that
involved stealth and currying favor within the official power
structure. In the United States, as banks became closely tied to
the government through regulation and policy,2 bank security
concerns shifted from the authorities to private robbers,
embezzlers and swindlers who could abscond with bank resources
1. David Abulafia, The Impact of Italian Banking in the Late Middle Ages and
the Renaissance,1300-1500, in BANKING, TRADE AND INDUSTRY; EUROPE AMERICA
AND ASIA FROM THE THIRTEENTH To THE TwENTIETH CENTURIES

17, 17-34 (Alice

Teichova, et al. eds., 1997).
2. Larry Schweikart, Banking in North America, 1700-1900, in BANKING, TRADE
AND INDUSTRY; EUROPE, AMERICA AND ASIA FROM THE THIRTEENTH To THE

TWENTIETH CENTURIES

,

297, 297-312 (Alice Teichoun, et al. eds., 1997). See also,

EDWIN HEATHCOTE, BANK BUILDERS

8-23 (2000).
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without the possibility of recourse. Now that financial service
companies are built on electronic foundations, and now that each
company's systems are increasingly interconnected, keeping
treasure secure has become a complicated and specialized task.
At the dawn of the third Gregorian millenium, financial
service companies face imposing risks ranging from market
volatility to balance sheet management, while they respond to the
needs of shareholders, customers, communities, employees,
markets and government regulators. This paper will address only
one set of risks confronting the modem financial services industry:
the security risks associated with financial services companies
keeping vital financial, business and account information on
electronic computing systems connected with public networks.
Electronic interconnectivity creates a "shared risk environment"
where each participant assumes some responsibility for the
security of the entire network. When a business chooses to
connect to the public network or to any computer network that
contains elements beyond the business' immediate control, the
business assumes risks created, condoned, perpetuated or
transmitted by other network participants.
Several unique features characterize the current shared risk
banking infrastructure. First, information is a financial company's
most valuable resource. Money is no longer measured by gold
bars, but by notations in a ledger. The data gleaned from
customer transactions is an asset to be hoarded or sold. Not only a
bank's business secrets, but also its inventory and stock in trade
are all stored as information. Second, all vital information is stored
and used in electronic formats. Electronic data and records can be
counterfeited,
copied, broadcast,
and analyzed
easily,
anonymously, and in very large numbers for an intruder with the
right tools.
Third, computers are connected with outside
networks, facilitating access by intruders. Fourth, banks have
relinquished most controls on customer access. Financial services
customers demand immediate and remote transactional capability
from their accounts at all hours of the day. Fifth, financial
sophistication has radically amplified business complexity. Banks
no longer just take deposits and lend cash; now banks sell mutual
funds, securities and insurance, underwrite third party risk,
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securitize every financial asset, and play in junk bonds, derivatives
and real estate investment trusts. Sixth, the work landscape
inhabited by modem financial companies is drastically more
complicated than in previous decades. Current companies employ
a mixture of traditional employees, leased employees, contractors,
temporary workers, consultants and outsourcing specialists, each
with varying levels of access to critical financial information.
Seventh, the American banking system is more active than ever
before in global finance, subjecting it to security risks from
multiple jurisdictions with varying laws.
Clearly, while information security is vital in such a shared
risk environment, it can only effectively alleviate limited categories
of risk. Global currency or investment risk, for example, can be
only modestly affected by tighter security procedures. If your
bank invested heavily in the Thai baht, or invested in companies
relying on a strong Thai currency, then the 1998 Asian financial
crisis would have rocked your bank's financial stability regardless
of its security measures. Therefore, because the focus of this
article is security strategies in a shared risk banking environment,
the authors will limit commentary to those risks arising from the
seven factors described above only where those risks can be
significantly reduced through well-considered information security
policies, tools and procedures.
This paper first explores the current state of banking in a
shared risk environment. After reviewing the context of early
bank security models and the general risks of interconnectivity, the
paper addresses which specific features of banking create unique
connectivity risks and describes the current regulatory response to
these threats. Finally, the authors discuss and recommend
strategies for meeting the modem bank's security needs and
regulatory requirements.
Financial service companies are spending billions of dollars
each year to address the security risks of today's interconnected
banking infrastructure. Financial service regulators are devoting
significant attention to the pitfalls of shared risk, holding bank
boards responsible for knowing the banks' information security
needs and for adequately addressing those needs. Shared risk
banking, whether telephone banking for consumers, online
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treasury management for corporations, or outsourcing key check
processing functions, demands new models of security to keep
integrity and trust in the American banking system. Because these
issues touch every aspect of a bank's business, from contracting to
regulatory compliance to customer satisfaction, bank counsel must
be sufficiently conversant with them to be able to lead their clients
through the labyrinth.
II. BANKING IN A SHARED RISK ENVIRONMENT

A.

TraditionalBank Security

The bank robber is a prominent figure of American
mythology. In the "wild west" of the late nineteenth century and
the depression of the 1930's, real life criminals became famous and
even popular for robbing banks Celebrated in movie and song,
these robbers exploited the primary weakness of banking security:
its people. "Slick Willie" Sutton claimed he robbed banks
"because that's where the money is," and he used guile, stealth,
and of course a gun, to complete his crimes.' The Dillinger gang
robbed several banks throughout the Midwest using brutal force to
overpower bank management and security. A Boston gang's
legendary robbery of cash and securities from the Brinks company
highlighted the dangers of outsourcing security to third party
companies. The more recent multi-million dollar theft at armored
car company, Loomis Fargo's facility in Charlotte, North Carolina
epitomized the common but least romanticized type of security

3. During these eras, many Americans perceived that banks exacerbated

economic problems through tight credit policies and that banks acted as instruments
of personal destruction for the banks' foreclosures on family farms and businesses.

4. Always polite and well-dressed, Sutton preferred to sneak into a bank while it
was closed or attempt his robbery in disguises such as a mailman or postal telegraph
messenger. One victim reported that witnessing one of Sutton's robberies was like
being at the movies, except that the usher had a gun. See Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Famous Cases, at http://www.fbi.gov/yourfbi/history/famcases/sutton/

sutton.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2001).
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breach - the inside job conducted by company employees!
These famous robberies demonstrate security problems
faced by traditional banks prior to the electronic age. During that
time, a bank's valuable assets consisted of physical objects, such as
cash and securities kept in a safe or a customer's jewelry held in
safe deposit boxes. While embezzlement could diminish bank
assets through creative accounting, most banks' security focused
on protecting the object of value locked behind iron doors. Bank
executives clearly understood the nature of their obligations in the
traditional business environment where concrete physical security
guarded physical objects. In short, thicker walls, more guns,
honest tellers and simple procedures were all that was needed to
protect any bank's trove.
To provide context for a later discussion of security in a
shared risk environment, the following paragraphs review
traditional security priorities for non-electronic banks. These
banks secure physical assets by relying on perimeter defenses and
watchful people.
1. Perimeter Defense
Securing a perimeter is the first element of physical
protection. Banks build safes with intricate locks and thick walls.
They wrap these safes in buildings where access is restricted with
double doors and steel cages. This system is the modern day
equivalent of a medieval keep surrounded by castle, moat,
battlement and more walls, with the object of keeping intruders at
bay and isolating ingress and egress for better monitoring. On a
much larger scale, the Great Wall of China exemplifies the same
principles: your valuables are safe if the bad guys cannot reach
them.
Perimeter security not only limits access to valuable
property, but also serves a deterrent function. Any wrongdoers
wishing to gain access to the protected property are forced to
calculate the amount of time and resources needed to breach the
-'SeeJeff Diamant, Easy Money, Hard Time, CHARLoTE.coM (CHARLoTTE
OBSERVER), http:/www.charlotte.com/observer/speciallheist/ pub/0905heist.htm
(Sep. 4,1999).

2001]

BANK SECURITY STRATEGY

walls and the likelihood of discovery and punishment. In other
words, effective perimeter security is equally valuable as a
deterrent to attempted theft as it is to thwarting actual attacks.
The higher the walls and the deeper the moat, the longer the siege
and the more men required to complete the task. Perimeter
security is always necessary, but seldom is it sufficient to deter all
attempts and thwart access. Protecting a treasure requires more
than just thick walls.7
2. The Human Element
The most important security problem with valuable
physical property is that the property must be accessed for its
value to be realized; its value diminishes if it cannot be counted,
appraised, admired or spent. Therefore, no matter how thick a
safe's walls or how deeply it is buried in the ground, its protector
must have some method for the property owners to access their
valuables. As exemplified by the famous robbery cases listed
above, wrongdoers tend to evade security and reach valuable
property the same way its owners would reach the property The
people guarding the property open doors to the robberies.9 While
6. When the prize is great, no wall may be high enough to stop a determined
foe. See Flavius Josphephus, The Horrors of the Siege, THE BOOK OF WAR: 25
CENTURIES OF GREAT WAR WRITING

(John Keegan ed., 1999), at 143 (giving a first-

hand account of the Roman Siege of Jerusalem in 69 AD). See also Andrew
Wheatcroft, The Fall of Constantinople, THE BOOK OF WAR: 25 CENTURIES OF
GREAT WAR WRITING, at 143-167 (covering the attack of the Golden Horn and the
Walls of Theodsius in 1453).
7. According to Machiavelli:
If the walls are built very high, they will be too much exposed to
artillery; if they are built very low they may be easily scaled; if you
dig a ditch on the outside of the walls to make an escalade more
difficult and the enemy should fill it up (which may be done by a
numerous army), he will immediately become master of them.
NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE ART OF WAR 183 (Neal Wood trans., Da Capo Press)
(1965).
8. Willie Sutton would walk into a bank before it opened, dressed as a Western
Union messenger, and take the bank guard's gun as he signed for a telegram. After
the guard admitted the bank manager, the manager was coerced into opening the

safe.

See QUENTIN REYNOLDS, I, WILLIE SUTTON: THE PERSONAL STORY OF THE

(1953), at 110-113.
9. In some cases like the Loomis Fargo heist, the people guarding the property

MOST DARING BANK ROBBER AND JAIL BREAKER OF OUR TIME
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the movies may show dramatic bank robberies that involve
cracking the combination of a safe, blowing a hole in the wall or
simply hauling the safe away to be broken at a distant location,
real life bank robbers who take physical cash or other objects of
value, tend to coerce or pay bank employees to gain standard
access to the vaults.
The vulnerabilities associated with the protection of
physical property arise from the character of bank employees as
well as security procedures implemented by management.
Individual bank employees can thwart security in many ways and
for many reasons."0 On one end of the culpability scale, a bank
employee may plan and execute a robbery of her employer. On
the other end of this scale, the employee may be coerced into
assisting the criminal or may unwittingly give away security secrets
through innocent but misguided actions or conversation. Even
assuming honest and careful people are working at a bank,
traditional bank security risks may be affected by company
policies. For example, if none of the regular employees at a
facility know how to open the vault or certain sections of the vault,
then a robber is less likely to gain access. A careful company may
implement a policy to limit employees' knowledge of daily security
procedures on a need-to-know basis. If fewer people have access
to valuable property, then criminals have fewer opportunities for
theft. In addition, policies regarding movement of valuable
property, storage of the property, accounting, auditing and taking
inventory can significantly affect the security of the bank's most
valuable physical property.
Prior to the digital revolution, bank security revolved
around protecting cash and other physical assets. This protection
was accomplished by setting up perimeter security, hiring trusted
are themselves the robbers. The Loomis Fargo robbers, who took the second largest
cash theft in United States history, included an employee and former employee of the
armored car company. Diamant, supra note 5. In other cases, the people responsible
for guarding the property are coerced or intimidated into allowing access to valuable
physical property.
10. See, e.g. Dennis Blank, When the Hacker is on the Inside: Thousands of
Attacks Each Year Come From Currentor FormerEmployees - And CompaniesAre
Only Now Beginning to Step Up Their Defenses, Bus. WK. ONLINE, at
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/dec2000/nf20001213_253.htm (Dec.13,
2000).
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employees and implementing protective policies. While these
measures stopped some robberies and deterred many others, the
Willie Suttons, John Dillingers, Brinks' robbers, and Loomis
Fargo's hijackers represent thousands of others who overcame the
security measures, at least for a time.
B.

New Risks from Interconnectivity

While the financial world has changed dramatically since
Willie Sutton's time, banks are still "where the money is." The
threats to banks have increased and the combination of
technology, globalization, deregulation and new business methods
have made information security infinitely more complex." This
section addresses the current state of interconnectivity, the shared
risk security model as it relates to banking and relevant businessspecific and regulatory security issues currently facing banks.
1. A Glimpse of the New Environment
During the past two decades, banking has drastically
changed. Most significant. to the discussion of information
security, the assets of banks have changed and the access to banks
has changed. Much of this shift was driven or permitted by new
technology that has allowed money to become information and
information to become money. Walter Wriston, former President
of Citicorp, is credited with the famous statement "Information
about money has become almost as important as money itself."' 2
Money has become primarily digital. The net worth of most

11. Certainly banks and other financial service companies must remain
concerned with physical security. People still
use guns and physical threats to take
money from banks. In addition, physical security is a vital element of sensible
information security. For example, a criminal could create havoc and learn valuable
information by walking into a financial company and stealing an entire network
server or key manager's personal computer (although system security such as screen
locks and encryption may thwart the attempt). However, this paper concentrates on
the electronic threats to information and the strategies designed to meet these new
threats.
12. Nikki Goth Itoi, Wriston Watch: Walter Wriston on the Role of Technology
and Finance, RED HERRING, Oct. 1998, at 63. This quotation is also inscribed in the
lobby of New York Science, Industry and Business Library.
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companies and individuals in today's society is measured in
electronic ledger notations, rather than physical goods. A person's
bank accounts, security holdings, and credit line are kept
electronically by financial institutions. Therefore, money is now
information.
But information is also money. "Banking has never truly
been about finance... It has been about access to information
about finance."13 Financial services companies are building
massive databases with information about customers, their
accounts, their preferences, and their financial habits. As more
consumers build multiple relationships with their banks, 4 these
databases become more powerful and more valuable. 5 Walter
Wriston made the following observation about the data mining
capability of banks:
The ability to have a huge database that a bank can
mine in real time means that when a bank calls a
customer, it knows that you've got a checking
account at the bank, that there are two CDs in safedeposit box, that you use their brokerage system,
that your income is x dollars, and that you live down
by the Embarcadero.
13. David J. Wallace, Business to Business; The Internet Gives CorporateBanking
a Do-It-Yourself Look, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13,2000, at 4. Mr. Wallace continued "The
Internet allows information flow instantly between the parties in a transaction. Early
systems had built-in delays because of mail, fax or phone delivery, and multiple levels
of management needed to approve payment. Using open Internet standards,
participants can revise an invoice anywhere a Web connection exists." Id.
14. In June [1998], Forrester Research conducted a survey of 120,000 consumers
in North America. The survey revealed that 64% of consumers would choose a bank
to consolidate their financial services, while less than 1% would switch to a
technology company that offered one-stop financial services shopping under its own
name. Nikki Goth Itoi, Breaking the Bank. Technology is ForcingBanks to Become
Nimble FinancialService Aggregators that Cater to Customers Through a Variety of
Electronic Channels - Because If They Don't, Yahoo and Intuit Will, RED HERRING,
Oct. 1998, at 64.
15. Jane Kaufman Winn & James R. Wrathall, Who Owns the Customer? The
Emerging Law of Commercial Transactions in Electronic Customer Data, 56 Bus. L.
213, 213-87 (2000). The article gives a detailed discussion of consumer databases
(especially pp. 230-38) as well as database case studies and legal analysis of privacy
issues. Id.
16. See Itoi, Wriston Watch: Walter Wriston on the Role of Technology and
Finance,supra note 12, at 63.
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Banks currently use this customer data to improve
customer service and to more directly target marketing of financial
services to customers likely to be interested in purchasing those
services. This information about money is extraordinarily valuable
to banks."
Compounding the changes wrought by the information
revolution is the interconnectivity revolution. Banks are no longer
simply isolated fortresses with thick walls and armed guards. In
fact, many current banks have no physical presence whatsoever."
The internal bank networks that arose through the late 1980's and
early 1990's became connected with each other. These networks
were also connected with public networks in the mid to late
1990's.'9 As a result, not only have significant bank assets been
17. For example,
The combination of larger, more robust customer databases and
sophisticated data warehousing and mining technology can offer
substantial competitive advantages to electronic commerce
businesses. Companies can develop the ability to better identify
likely customers and to recognize and anticipate individual
preferences, resulting in increased sales and higher margins. In
addition, once it is assembled, a customer database may be shared
with other companies, offering an additional revenue stream at a
low incremental cost.
Winn & Wrathall, supra note 15, at 235-36.
18. See Vanessa Richardson, Breaking the Virtual Bank, REDHERRING.COM (Feb.
22, 2000), at http://vww.redherring.com/vc/2000/0222/vc-onlinebanks022200.html
(last visited Mar. 3, 2001). Richardson states that at the time of the writing there
were "currently more than 30 Internet banks in operation." Id. She cites Dataquest
as predicting that "one-third of the 60 to 100 new online banks will fail within the
next three years." Id. See also, THOMAs P. VARTANIAN, REMOTE BANKING AND
FINANCIAL SERVICES (2000). Vartanian provides an in-depth discussion of all aspects
of remote banking. He describes a company known as TeleBank based in Arlington,
Virginia, which has no physical branches and its customers bank exclusively by phone
and by mail. Id. TeleBank was acquired in January 2000 by ETRADE Group, Inc.
and is now known as ETRADE Bank. Id.
19. According to Breaking the Bank,
In the early 90s, banks typically spent most of their technology
budgets on systems for employee use and for upgrades and
maintenance of existing facilities - that is, on internal
development. Only about three percent was funneled into
external development of new systems.... By 1995, when U.S.
industry-wide technology spending measured about 25 billion
dollars, the percentage dedicated to external IT projects had risen
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moved to a digital format,' but anyone with access to public
networks can attempt to reach that value. Clearly, in this new
world order, banks must have more than perimeter-based security
to address the risks of valuable assets.
There is no turning back. Bank customers are demanding
the instant 24-hour access and better financial control offered by
digital banks connected to public networks. Robert Sterling, an
analyst with Juniper Communications, was quoted in the New
York Times stating that approximately 10% of American
consumers bank online and in 1999, 8.3 million people shopped for
mortgages and other loans on the internet, with one of eight
starting the loan application process online." At the time of this
writing, Bank of America claims over three million online banking
customers, and Wells Fargo claims more than two million banking
customers. '
Bankers with digital assets in a networked world must
assess the new banking risks and meet them with new security
measures.
2. The Shared Risk Security Model
Computers connect into networks and computer users
share the security risks. When a wrongdoer breaks into one
computer or server, he may be able to access any other computer
on the network. As computers in all industries and sectors tie
together, bringing new value to the system, new vulnerabilities
to 20%, or 4.3 billion dollars. Gary Craft, an analyst with
BankAmerica Robertson Stephens, believes that the figure will
approach 8.6 billion by 2000.
Itoi, Breaking the Bank, supra note 13, at 62.
20. As much as 600 billion dollars of the market value represented by today's
financial service companies may eventually be moved online. See Richardson, supra
note 18.
21. Patrick McGeehan, PersonalFinance;Banks are Slow to Move Online, But So

Are Their Customers,N. Y. TIMES, June 7, 2000, at H6.
22. Press Release, Bank of America, Bank of America Exceeds 3 Million Online
Banking Customers, http://www.bankofamerica.com/newsroom/press/press.cfm?Press
ID=press.2001009.01.htm

(Jan. 9, 2001); Press Release, Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo

First Major Bank To Launch Nationwide Wireless Banking, at http://www.wellsfargo.
comlpress/pressO10207.jhtml;$sessionid$5VCGUFYAAIUY4CQMKVDFARQKBR

KTMUMO (Feb. 7,2001).
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follow. 3 In testifying before the United States Congress regarding
protection of information infrastructure, Deputy Secretary of
Defense John J. Hamre stated that "As... Services and Agencies
interconnect more of their networks, we are creating a shared risk
environment. In a shared risk environment, the security posture of
the interconnected systems is only as great as the system with the
weakest assurance posture - in effect, the weakest link in the
chain."'24 While customers demand interconnectivity and banks
profit from the networked computer infrastructure, the shared risk
environment ensures that weakness in one node may be exploited
throughout the system.' In today's seamless worldwide web,
23. "As a result of advances in information technology and the necessity of
improved efficiency... [critical national] infrastructures have become increasingly
automated and interlinked. These same advances have created new vulnerabilities to
equipment failures, human error, weather and other natural causes, and physical and
cyber attacks." Presidential Decision Directive 63, The Clinton Administration's
Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection, May 22, 1998, available at http://www.
ciao.gov/CIAODocument__Library/paper598.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2001)
[hereinafter Clinton White Paper on Critical Infrastructure Protection].
24. Briefing on Information Assurance and Critical Infrastructure Protection
Before The Subcommittee on Procurementand R&D of the House National Security
Committee, 105th Cong. (1998) (testimony of John J. Hamre, Deputy Secretary of
Defense).
25. It has been noted that,
[I]n addition to its benefits, this widespread interconnectivity poses
enormous risks to our computer systems and, more importantly, to
the critical operations and infrastructures they support ....Our
nation's computer-based critical infrastructures are at increasing
risk of severe disruption. Interconnectivity increases the risk that
problems affecting one system will also affect other interconnected
systems. Massive computer networks provide pathways among
systems that, if not properly secured, can be used to gain
unauthorized access to data
and operations from remote
locations. While the threats or sources of these problems can
include natural disasters, such as earthquakes, and system-induced
problems... government officials are increasingly concerned
about attacks from individuals and groups with malicious
intentions, such as terrorists and nations engaging in information
warfare.
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
PROTECTION 3 (1999).

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

"Given the risks and the fact that weakness in any portion of our network is a threat
to the operational readiness of all connections, our Information Assurance goal is to
ensure the continuous availability of our systems and networks." Computer Security:
Cyber Attacks - War without Borders: Hearings Before the Subcomm. for Gov't
Mgmt., Info. and Tech. of the House Gov't Reform Comm., 106th Cong. (2000)
(testimony of Mario Balakgie, Chief Information Assurance Officer, Defense
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electronic threats can rise from across the globe as easily as from
next door.' Understanding the peril faced by today's networked
financial services companies requires examining the types of risk
caused by their infrastructure and exploring the current
inadequacies of the law.
a. Defining Financial Services Risk
Banks are faced with innumerable risks arising from their
interconnected computer networks.
Because of this risk,
regulators charged with examining and protecting the financial
services industry have carefully categorized the types of risk faced
by banks. Based on the risks, associated with their business and
technology, banks are required to evaluate their own performance
and underlying strengths.
Other measures of risk can also help banks understand the
threats to earnings, capital and stability. Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) Director Louis Freeh testified before the
United States Senate Judiciary Committee last year, noting the
explosive growth in computer intrusion cases handled by the FBI."
Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense).
26. Janet Reno commented:
As people can sit in a kitchen in St. Petersburg, Russia and steal
from a bank in Chicago.... as people can extort people halfway
around the world, how will we build a partnership with our
colleagues around the world to track these people, to bring them
to justice and to make again the opportunities of the internet real
for the world?
United States Attorney General Janet Reno, Address at the Cybercrime Summit: A
Law Enforcement/Information Technology Industry Dialogue on Prevention,
Detection, Investigation and Cooperation at the Stanford University Law School
(Apr. 5,2000).
27. Statement on Cybercrime: Hearingson S.2092 Before the Subcomm. for Tech.,
Terrorism and Gov't Info. of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 106th Cong (2000)
(testimony of Louis J. Freeh, Director United States Federal Bureau of
Investigation), http://www.fbi.gov/pressrmlcongress/congressOO/cyberO32800.htm (last
visited Feb. 27, 2001) [hereinafter Freeh Testimony]. Director Freeh reported:
Our caseload is increasing dramatically. In FY 1998, we opened
547 computer intrusion cases; in FY 1999, that had jumped to 1154.
At the same time, because of the opening the National
Infrastructure Protection Center (NIAC) in February 1998, and
our improving ability to fight cyber crime, we closed more cases.
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Freeh told the Committee that ninety percent of the companies in
private survey reported security breaches and at least seventy-four
percent of the companies reported "security breaches including
theft of proprietary information, financial fraud, system
penetration by outsiders, data or network sabotage, or denial of
service attacks."' This survey obviously did not report the large
number of computer intrusions that go undetected. Director
Freeh then described for the Committee some of the categories of
specific electronic threats faced by American business and
government in 2000. He included threats from insiders, 9 hackers
(or crackers),' virus writers,3 criminal groups,32 terrorists,33 foreign
In FY 1998, we closed 399 intrusion cases, and in FY 1999, we
closed 912 such cases. However, given the exponential increase in
the number of cases opened, cited above, our actual number of
pending cases has increased by 39 percent, from 601 at the end of
FY 1998, to 834 at the end of FY 1999. In short, even though we
have markedly improved our capabilities to fight cyber intrusions,
the problem is growing even faster.
Id.
28. Id. See also, The Internet Integrity and CriticalInfrastructureProtectionAct:
Hearingon S.2448 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,106th Cong. (2000).
Information theft and financial fraud caused the most severe
financial losses, put at $68 million and $56 million respectively.
The losses from 273 respondents totaled just over $2265 million.
Losses traced to denial of service attacks were only $77,000 in
1998, and by 1999 had risen to just $116,250. Further, the new
survey reports on numbers taken before the high-profile February
attacks against Yahoo, Amazon and eBay.
Id.
29. The Statement on Cybercrime noted:
The disgruntled insider (a current of former employee of a
company) is a principal source of computer crimes for many
companies. Insiders' knowledge of the target companies' network
often allows them to gain unrestricted access to cause damage to
the system or to steal proprietary data. The just-released 2000
survey by the Computer Security Institute and FBI reports that
71% of respondents detected unauthorized access to systems by
insiders.
Id.
30. Director Freeh notes that cracking may be attempted "for the thrill of the
challenge" or for personal profit. Id. He also discusses the rise of politically
motivated hacking undertaken to send a message. Id.
31. "Virus writers are posing an increasingly serious threat to networks and
systems worldwide. Last year saw the proliferation of several destructive computer
viruses or 'worms,' including the Melissa Macro Virus, the Explore.Zip worm, and
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intelligence services, ' information warfare,' Internet fraud,36
intellectual property theft,' as well as distributed denial of service
attacks.' The list of threats that the new digitized, interconnected
infrastructure has imposed on banking should also include identity
theft, 9 spoofing (known as page-jacking) ° and facilitated money
the CIH (Chernobyl) Virus." Id.
32. Freeh discusses the international criminal theft conspiracy called the
"Phonemasters" who combined physical techniques like dumpster diving and pretext
telephone calling (often referred to as "social engineering") with computer system
penetration to steal calling card numbers. Id. He also uses the example of the gang
of thieves led by Vladimir Levin, a Russian computer expert who illegally transferred
more than $10 million from Citibank corporate customers. Id.
33. Freeh's testimony also states:
Terrorists groups are increasingly using new information
technology and the Internet to formulate plans, raise funds, spread
propaganda and to communicate securely... While we have not
yet seen these groups employ cyber tools as a weapon to use
against critical infrastructures, their reliance on information
technology and acquisition of computer expertise are clear
warning signs.
Moreover, we have seen other terrorist
groups... engage in attacks on foreign government web-sites and
email servers.
Freeh Testimony, supra note 27.
34. Freeh was coy in delineating this threat. "While I cannot go into specifics
about more recent [than 1986] developments in an open hearing, it should not
surprise anyone to hear that foreign intelligence services increasingly view computer
intrusions as a useful tool for acquiring sensitive U.S. government and private sector
information." Id.
35. "The prospect of 'information warfare' by foreign militaries against our
critical infrastructures is perhaps the greatest potential cyber threat to our national
security. We know that several foreign nations are developing information warfare
doctrine, programs, and capabilities for use against the United States and other
nations." Id.
36. Freeh uses this category to describe consumer-oriented fraud schemes using
the Internet as a communications medium. Id.
37. Freeh limits this discussion to pirated digitized products like software, music
and movies using the Internet as a distribution medium. Id. He does not address a
type of intellectual property theft relevant to the financial services industry, the loss
of trade secrets and other proprietary information using the Internet as an access tool
to enter bank business systems, or as a broadcast tool for a disgruntled employee. Id.
38. Freeh notes that:
[Hjackers plant tools... on a number of unwitting victim systems.
Then when the hacker sends the command, the victim systems in
turn begin sending messages against a target system. The target
system is overwhelmed with the traffic and is unable to function.
Users trying to access that system are denied its service.
Id.
39. Identity theft pertains to obtaining and using individual consumer financial
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laundering.4
As demonstrated above, the risks now facing banks are
infinitely more complicated than Willie Sutton at the door with a
gun. The new Willie Sutton may be an ocean and half a continent
away from the bank when he breaks into the electronic vault. Or
the new threat may rise because the bank is an important link in
the American critical infrastructure, and thus a political threat,
rather than just a money repository.42 The next section examines
risks associated with this complexity by reviewing the features of
the new technology that create identifiable risk.
b. Security Risks Rising from Networked Digital
Information
The Internet contains several unique features as a business
tool that present new security challenges for financial services
institutions. The most obvious is two-way connectivity. Unlike
information to engage in fraudulent transactions. See generally Exec. Order No.
13133, Appendix A, at 3, 64 C.F.R. 43895 (Aug. 5, 1999), amended by Internet False
Identification Prevention Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-578, 114 Stat. 3075 (2000). See
also, Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (a)(7)
(Supp. IV 1998).
40. Page-jacking pertains stealing from other websites descriptions, mega-tags or
keywords. See generally Exec. Order 13133, supra note 39, Appendix A, at 4. Pagejackers places this information on their own site to misdirect users to their site. Id.
The most dangerous trend in page-jacking is not the common misdirection toward
pornographic Internet sites, but the fake bank sites that catch the typing mistake of
an unsuspecting consumer and then, posing as the legitimate bank's Web site,
requests the consumer's personal account information. "As long as a bank's Web site
looks professional and has effective navigation, customers perceive it as secure."
Olga Kharif, Sounding the Alarm over Fake Bank Sites, Bus. WK. ONLINE (Aug. 7,
2000), at http://www.businessweek.com/printbwdaily/dnflashlaug2000/nf2000087_172
.htm (quoting Cheskin Research partner Steve Diller) (last visited Feb. 27, 2001).
"When typing their passwords at a false bank site, customers could give hackers
access to the real bank - and their accounts. Ensuring authenticity of the bank, the
customer, and of each transaction is the online banking industry's most pressing
concern now..." Id. (quoting Richard Mack, manager at RSA Security).
41. See Christopher D. Hoffman, Encrypted Digital Cash Transfers: Why
Traditional Money Laundering Controls May Fail Without Uniform Cryptography
Regulations,21 FORDHAM INT'L. L. J., 799 (1998).
42. Critical infrastructures are those physical and cyber-based systems essential
to the minimum operations of the economy and government. Clinton White Paper
on Critical Infrastructure Protection, supra note 23, at 1. They include, but are not
limited to, telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, transportation, water
systems and emergency services, both governmental and private. Id.
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media such as television, radio or newspapers, the Internet allows
interactive tools such as email, chat, order forms and immediate
response functions. Unlike other one-to-one communication
media like telephone or telegraph, the Internet allows one person
to publish for a mass audience. Unlike all other media, the
Internet permits any person with an electronic connection to have
immediate, interactive access to the infrastructure of business and
government. Just as retail businesses for centuries have kept their
doors open to encourage customers, banks allow connections to
the Internet to facilitate communication and file sharing. But the
open door may also bring the undesirable bugs, rats and brigands
into the bank. This unprecedented electronic access occurs at the
point in history when banks are consolidating their most valuable
assets - money, securities, intellectual property and customer
databases - as information in electronic formats. Banks may be
storing these valuables where they may be reached from the
Internet. Creative methods of reaching secret information43 are
only matched by the creative ways people find to make mischief
with the information.'
Another useful but dangerous function of networked
electronic information is the digitization itself. Digital information,
whether movies, software or personal checks, can be easily
duplicated with no degradation in future generations of duplicates.
Furthermore, through use of encryption, communication of the
digital information can be anonymous, allowing unlimited and
untraceable copies of products, programs and promissory notes.
Banks are accustomed to managing a certain degree of anonymity;
cash is anonymous and other paper instruments of value, like
bearer bonds, may be traded anonymously. Several electronic
systems are moving toward the goal of anonymous digital cash.45
43. See, e.g., Mike Brunker, Vast Online Credit Card Theft Revealed: Hacker Hid
Data on 485,000 Cards on U.S. Agency's Web Site, MSNBC.com, http://www.msnbc.

com/news/382561.asp (Mar. 17,2001).
44. See, e.g., Alex Salkever, Cyber-Extortion: When Data is Held Hostage, Bus
WK. ONLINE (Aug. 22, 2000), at http://www.businessweek.com/print/bwdaily/dnflash/

aug2000/nf20000822_308.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2001) (reporting two Russian
computer experts tried to charge Bloomberg $200,000 in "consulting" fees to
privately reveal how to compromise the Bloomberg computer systems).

45. See generally Hoffman, supra note 41.
Hoffman discusses various
technologies and systems supporting a movement toward digital cash. He includes
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However, the easy duplication and anonymity of electronic
information on the Internet, even electronic cash, create security
problems for financial services companies.'
Anonymous
transactions and easily duplicated targets give cover to thieves,
terrorists and money launderers.' Furthermore, law enforcement
officials may be uncomfortable with anonymity in the financial
system, and financial service providers may be required to strip
some of the anonymity from electronic financial transactions.'
For decades, one of a bank's most important security
measures has been careful accounting.
Trustworthy record
keeping thwarted embezzlement and caught sneaky robbers. The
digital financial infrastructure has made financial accounting both
easier and more difficult. Automated accounting allows the
analysis of digital coins, stored value cards and key escrow cryptography, before
leaping into an examination of laundering digital money. Hoffman states:
The most dangerous aspects of electronic money making it
conducive to money laundering are its speed and anonymity.
Fortified by cryptography, electronic money precludes retracing
the countless transfers in the layering and placement stages of the
laundering process... Conducted outside the regulated network of
financial institution, such transfers may thwart current measures
enacted to prevent money laundering unless law enforcement
officials can trace the funds without relying on paper trails.
Id. at 845-846.
46. "Anonymous communication is a great tool for evading detection of illegal
and immoral activity. Conspiracy, electronic hate-mail and hate-speech in general,
electronic stalking, libel, general nastiness, disclosure of trade secrets and other
valuable intellectual property, all become lower-risk activities if conducted via
anonymous communications." A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the
Information Ocean: Living with Anonymity, Digital Cash, and DistributedDatabases,
15 J. L. & COM., 395,402 (1996).
47. Freeh stated that:
[O]ne of the largest challenges to FBI computer investigative
capabilities lies in the increasingly widespread use of strong
encryption... [which] has placed a tremendous burden on the
FBI's electronic surveillance technologies. Today the most basic
communications employ layers of protocols, formatting,
compression and proprietary coding that were non-existent only a
few years ago.
Freeh testimony, supra note 27.
48. Froomkin, supra note 48, at 399. Froomkin suggests "that governments may
be able to control anonymous commerce by concentrating on financial service
providers. Financial service providers are already highly regulated, and present a
relatively easy target for governments seeking to prevent fully anonymous fund
transfers." Id. at 400-01.
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computer to perform rote functions and removes human error
from many administrative functions. However, when a company
automates its books, its accountants step further away from the
actual counting as the institution places faith in the technology.
Clever criminals who understand the technology may steal a
bank's money with a simple transfer order through a glitch in the
accounting software, removing all need for the physical action
required for a bank robbery. By the time accountants discover a
software problem (if they ever do), the criminal may have long ago
disappeared from the bank's systems and records, while the money
may have bounced electronically through ten different countries.
Electronic record keeping combined with electronic transfer
procedures can lead to bank robbery from a living room miles
away.
To take full advantage of cost savings and accessibility
improvements offered by electronic commerce, financial services
companies must be able to contract electronically. In other words,
a business will lose transactions and pay more money to process
transactions if sales initiated on the Internet must be completed on
paper.' But electronic contracting creates a new level of security
risk for financial institutions.
First, the fundamental legal
framework must provide certainty that electronic contracts will be
treated the same as paper contracts under the eyes of the law and
as an evidentiary matter in court.' The United States federal
49. Geanne Rosenberg, Legal Uncertainty Clouds Status of Contractson Internet,

N.Y. TrMES, July 7, 1997 at D1.
50. Andrew J. Pincus, General Counselof the United States Department of

Commerce, described the legal framework surrounding electrionic signatures:
The basic legal framework needed to enable electronic
transactions in a commercial context consists of two essential
elements. First is the elimination of statutory rules requiring paper
contracts. There is a broad consensus that - with the exception of
a few specialized agreements (wills and property deeds, for

example) - parties' electronic agreements should have the same
legal status as paper agreements.

The second element involves when and how an electronic
commercial contract becomes legally binding on, and therefore
enforceable in court against, a person or entity that is a party to
the contract. In the off-line world, the key question is whether a
party has manifested its intent to be bound by the contract, which

generally occurs through a written record, and often, affixing a
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government and several states attempted to provide legal certainty
in electronic contracting by passing digital signature laws.' A
secured transaction of information must have the following five
characteristics: (1) identification of the parties; (2) privacy; (3)
authentication; (4) integrity; and (5) non-repudiation.
While
clear and comprehensive digital signature laws may assist in
assuring non-repudiation of electronic contracts, these laws do not
affect the other requirements for a secured transaction. Electronic
contracting will continue to raise security and enforceability
problems for financial service institutions until the laws are
completely settled and the market agrees on a safe, easy and
inexpensive cryptography regime to assure identification and
privacy of the parties, authentication of the transaction and
assurance of its integrity. 3
Finally, the combination of electronic accounting systems,
electronic storage of value, electronic documents, and immediate,
constant electronic connections with customers and vendors allow
banks to manage more assets and more transactions in more
financial arenas than ever before.
This provides more
opportunities for shareholder profit. However, the complexity
written signature to that written record. A signature, however,

often is not a legal requirement (for example, a binding contract
may be formed through an exchange of telegrams).
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act: Hearings on H.R. 1714,

Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property on the House Judiciary
Comm., 106th Cong. (1999) (testimony of Andrew J. Pincus, General Counsel,

United States Department of Commerce).
51. See Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, Pub. L. No.

106-299, 114 Stat. 464, 465-473 (2000). See also, Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§44-7001 - 44-7051
(2000); Cal. Civil Code §§1633.1 - 1633.17 (West 2000); Del. Code ANN. tit. 6, §§12A-

101 - 12A-117 (2000); Fla. Stat. ANN. §668.50 (West 2000); Haw. Rev. Stat. §489E
(2000); Idaho Code §28-50 (Michie 2000); Ind. Code §26-2-8; Iowa Code §554D
(2001); Kan. Stat. ANN. §§16-1601 - 16-1620 (2000); Me. Rev. Stat. ANN. tit. 10,

§§9401 - 9419 (West 2000); Mich. Comp. Laws §§450.831 - 450.849 (2000); Minn. Stat.
§325L (2000); Neb. Rev. Stat. §86-2101 - 86-2116 (2000); N.C. Gen. Stat. §66-308

(2000); Ohio Rev. Code ANN. §§1306.01 - 1306.15 (West 2000); Okla. Stat. tit. 12A,
§§15-101 - 15-120 (2000); Pa. Stat. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 2260.101-2260.5101 (West 2000);
R.I. Gen. Laws §42-127.1 (2000); S.D. Codifided Laws §§53-12-1 - 53-12-50 (2000);

Utah Code Ann. §§46-4-101 - 46-4-501 (2000); Va. Code Ann. §§59.1-479 - 59.1-498
(Michie 2000).
52. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, The Essential Role of Trusted Third
Partiesin Electronic Commerce, 75 OR. L. Rav. 49 (1996).
53. See Symposium, Financial Services: Security, Privacy and Encryption, 3 B. U.
J. Sci. & TECH. L. 4 (1997).
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that accompanies this flexibility leads to greater security risks.
More complexity means more opportunity for human error, for
unobserved machine error, or for financial losses to escape the
standard system of controls. More complexity means less people
with a broad encompassing knowledge of the entire system and
more risk that the secure parts of a bank's infrastructure will not
fit together properly. Greater complexity means more misplaced
credits and requires a longer time to investigate losses. For
example, financial regulators have noted that outsourcing key
technical functions is a troublesome business complexity.'
Outsourcing increases the complexity of managing technology
tasks while reducing the control a financial institution maintains
over the process.55 In short, greater complexity can provide a
myriad of opportunities for successful and anonymous theft or
damage.
c. Current Legal Gaps
The law lags, rather than leads, society.
So while
networked digital information rapidly pervades our homes and
businesses, the law moves slowly in its wake, addressing issues as
they reach courts or create public outrage. Gaps between the
realities of the shared-risk infrastructure and the current state of
law magnify security risks faced by banks. The United States
54. FFIEC Guidance on Managing Risks Associated With

Technology Services, [Current Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)

Outsourcing

60-707 (FDIC

FIN. INST. LETTER 81-2000, Nov. 29, 2000), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/

news/financial/2000/fil0081.html (last visited Mar. 3,2001).
55. Risks of outsourcing information and transaction processing and settlement
activities include:

[t]hreats to security, availability and integrity of systems and
resources, confidentiality of information, and regulatory
compliance.... Management should consider additional risk
management controls when services involve the use of the
Internet.

The broad geographic reach, ease of access, and

anonymity of the Internet require close attention to maintaining
secure systems, intrusion detection and reporting systems, and
customer authentication, verification and authorization.
Id. at 2. The FDIC letter notes that bank managers should pay special attention to 1)
due diligence in selecting a service provider, 2) contract requirements of that service
provider, and 3) continuing oversight of that service provider. Id.
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Congress has recently passed legislation regarding electronic
contracting and consumer privacy in financial information. 6
However, recent Congressional bills relating to the Internet have
tended to focus on social and consumer issues,'7 although this
federal Internet legislative agenda covers law enforcement issues
important to the financial services industry." Despite progress,
many areas of American business law remain unclear or unsettled,
including multi-state use of electronic signatures' 9 use of
encryption,
and evidentiary issues."
Furthermore, many

56. See supra note 51 (electronic signatures) and infra note 65 (consumer
privacy).
57. The 106th Congress introduced several bills designed to protect children
online. See Cybermolesters Enforcement Act of 2000, H.R. 4076.IH, S. 2280.IS,
106th Congress (2000); Children's Internet Protection Act, H.R. 543.IH, S. 97.IS,
106th Congress (2000); Student Privacy Protection Act, H.R. 2915.IH, S. 1908.IS,
106th Congress (2000); Children's Protection Act 2000, S. 2127.IS, 106th Congress
(2000); Neighborhood Children's Internet Protection Act, S. 1545.IS, 106th Congress
(2000). See also S. RES. 294.IS, 106 Congress (2000) (designating the month of
October 2000 as Children's Internet Safety Month).
58. See, e.g., Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998,18 U.S.C. §
1028 (Supp. IV 1998) (criminalizing identity theft); Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994) (penalizing the misuse of information gathered electronically
without permission); Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22,
2701-11 (1994). Although some commentators have argued that even these and
related criminal laws protecting digital information should be updated. See Freeh
Testimony, supra note 27, at 10-11 (the FBI supports strengthening "the general
deterrence aspects of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and to provide some
needed procedural enhancements to help us confront the expanding criminal
threat..."). While Congress has addressed Online Securities Fraud, general laws
prohibiting fraud can apply to conduct over the Internet as well as traditional
situations: See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a-n) (1994) (unfair methods of competition); 15 U.S.C.
§ 52 (a)-(b) (1994) (governing dissemination of false advertisements); 15 U.S.C. §
1644 (a)-(f) (1994) (addressing fraudulent use of credit cards; penalties); 18 U.S.C. §
1341 (1994) (frauds swindles); 18 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994) (addressing ficticious names or
addresses); 18 U.S.C. §1344 (1994) (governing bank fraud).
59. State laws may contain different requirements and safe harbors than the
federal Electronic Signatures Act and many business owners are unclear which of
these state laws are preempted by this federal Act.
60. The Clinton administration has changed its position on export of encryption
several times, leaving businesses uncertain on the appropriate use of this protection
technology. The inconsistencies in public policy are a result of the tension between
the need for secure methods to conduct legitimate business online and lawenforcement's desire to deny electronic privacy to criminals and terrorists. See, e.g.,
F. Lynn McNulty, Encryption'sImportance to Economic and InfrastructureSecurity, 9
DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L., 430, 430-48 (1999) (discussing United States and
international approaches to cryptography policy).
61. Digital information can be altered in such a way that destroys its evidentiary
value, and courts have not conclusively ruled how such evidence will be treated.
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computer hackers invading business and government systems are
juveniles, and current U.S. law may hinder prosecution of juvenile
attackers.62 As a final point, the digital economy is global in scale
and reach, and international legal inconsistencies provide
additional security risks to financial services companies. Many
nations have not passed laws that prohibit crimes against
electronic information systems.' Furthermore, businesses in the
United States may find barriers to investigation and prosecution of
computer crimes committed from personal computers or servers
located in other countries.' Financial institutions face security
62. Freeh Testimony, supra note 27, at 10 (explaining even though 18 U.S.C. §
1030 (1994) does not currently allow for the prosecution of juveniles who commit
computer violations, S. 2092 would permit the Attorney General to prosecute
juveniles for certain felony violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994)).
63. According to the McConnell International study on cybercrimes:
[T]he laws of most countries do not clearly prohibit cyber crimes.
Existing terrestrial laws against physical acts of trespass or
breaking and entering often do not cover their 'virtual'
counterparts. Web pages such as the e-commerce sites recently hit
by widespread, distributed denial of service attacks may not be
covered by outdated laws as protected forms of property. New
kinds of crimes can fall between the cracks, as the Philippines
learned when it attempted to prosecute the perpetrator of the May
2000 Love Bug virus, which caused billions of dollars of damage
worldwide.
MCCONNELL INTERNATIONAL, CYBER CRIME...

AND PUNISHMENT?

ARCHAIC

LAWs THREATEN GLOBAL INFORMATION, at 2 (Dec. 2000), available at http://www.
mcconnellinternational.com/services/CyberCrime.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2001). The
McConnell International study surveyed fifty-two countries, ten of which had laws
allowing the prosecution of perpetrators of data crimes, network crimes, access
crimes and related crimes like computer-related fraud (McConnell refers to these
countries as having "substantially or fully updated laws"). Id. at 4. Nine of the
surveyed countries had "partially updated" laws, while McConnell found no
"updated laws" for the remaining thirty-three surveyed countries. Id.
64. A report from the Department of Justice explains that:
As a result [of worldwide computer linkages], a criminal no longer
needs to be at the actual scene of the crime (or within 1,000 miles,
for that matter) to prey on his or her victims... Long-distance
detection, however, may take the investigation and prosecution of
these crimes out of the exclusive purview of any single jurisdiction,
thereby creating yet other challenges and obstacles to crimesolving.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON UNLAWFUL CONDUCT ON
THE INTERNET, THE ELECTRONIC FRONTEER: THE CHALLENGE OF UNLAWFUL

INVOLVING
THE
USE
OF
THE
INTERNET
(Mar.
2000),
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/unlawful.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2001), at
CONDUCT
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hazards caused by uncertainty and inconsistency in the law
regarding crimes against information systems and networks. Aside
from these new general risks arising from the shared-risk
infrastructure, banking institutions must consider their specific
new products and business methods to determine how each one
affects their security posture. Financial institutions and their
regulators are currently wrestling with proposed solutions to risks
emerging from networked digital information.
C.

Current Supervisory Issues in a Shared Risk Banking
Environment

1. The Shared Risk Implications of
Bank-Customer Connectivity
As discussed above, it is accepted wisdom that there have
been profound changes in the business of banking, and in the
financial services industry generally, in recent years. The range
and sophistication of the products and services offered by banks
has expanded considerably, affiliations of banks with other types
of financial service providers are now permitted, and banking
services are available to customers on a 24 hour/7 day-a-week
basis, from any number of delivery channels. Willie Sutton may be
hard pressed even to recognize a bank at the onset of the 2 1St
century.
These profound changes, however, have been largely
changes of structure and process. The core of the banking
business, meanwhile, remains what it always has been: the
connection between banker and customer. Banking continues to
be a relationship business, entirely dependent upon the
communication of information between a bank and its customer.
That information can take many forms: the identification of the
20-21. See also Mike Brunker, E-business vs. the Perfect Cybercrime: U.S. Authorities
Can't Touch Credit Card Fraud From Overseas, Mar. 3, 2001, at
http://www.msnbc.com/new/376973.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2001) (reporting that

"[a]n investigation by MSNBC has learned that while criminals based overseas now
account for up to a third of all online fraud directed at U.S. e-businesses, there is no

evidence that a single one of these crooks has been prosecuted").
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customer; the bank's condition and competence; the articulation of
the customer's needs and the bank's ability to satisfy those needs;
the information necessary for the bank to assess the customer's
creditworthiness; the agreed-upon terms of a transaction between
bank and customer; or the transmittal of monetary value in the
form of cash or debit and credit entries. Thus, at its essence, a
bank deals in the transmission of information between itself and its
customers.
It is the ability of the bank and its customer to connect
through various means of communication that makes this
transmission of information possible and enables the business of
banking to be conducted. This concept of interconnectivity is also
at the center of the current supervisory concerns over risk and the
appropriate allocation of risk within the banking industry. These
concerns have centered on the proliferation of available means of
communication or "delivery channels" between the bank and its
customers and the vulnerability of those channels to error,
compromise or failure.
A fascinating feature of the development of new delivery
channels for bank customers is that as more means of
interconnectivity between the bank and its customers have been
made available, more and more control over those means has been
ceded by the bank to the customer. For example, several decades
ago, banking was conducted almost exclusively in person at a
bank's offices during the bank's (usually rather abbreviated)
banking hours. The bank controlled the means of connectivity
almost exclusively; the delivery channel was the bank's brick-andmortar facilities, where a customer's account information was kept
in tangible form (remember passbook accounts?) and the channel
was open only when the banker was in the office. Contrast that
with contemporary banking, in which the delivery channels are
many and varied, are remote and virtual (telephone access and
web-based communications are examples), and are available upon
the customer's initiation and in many cases whenever the customer
wants them, around-the-clock. Thus, the rules of connectivity
have come to be determined more by the customer than by the
bank. The product of this shift of control over the means of
connectivity is that banking has become more of a shared-risk
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environment. Because banks have had to permit the bankcustomer interface to migrate further from the bank's traditional
security perimeter, it has become increasingly difficult for banks to
recognize, assess and protect against risks of mistake, fraud and
intrusion.
2. Risks to Banks of Increased Interconnectivity
Regardless of the delivery channel used, an increase in the
ease and frequency with which customers can access information
resident in a bank's database necessarily involves a trade-off of
security and control of that information.' As banks (along with
businesses of all types) implement high-technology systems that
give customers and potential customers ease of access, several
major types of unauthorized activity render these systems
particularly vulnerable. They are (1) hacking,in which an intruder
breaks into a system either for mischief or just to prove it can be
done; (2) identity theft, through which an intruder captures a
customer's unique identifying information (account numbers,
social security number, address, phone number, etc.) for use in
fraudulent transactions, either with the bank or otherwise; (3)
spoofing, by which an intruder electronically poses as the bank's
server in order to capture identifiers, passwords and other
information from an authorized user attempting to access the
65. There are several types of risk that this article will not address. One topic not
discussed herein, but that has received abundant attention from industry observers
and the regulatory agencies themselves, is that of customer information privacy and
security in the context of electronic banking. The issues raised by customer
expectations of privacy and security in electronic banking transactions are the
application of the privacy provisions of Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of
1999 (Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)), and their implementing regulations
to electronic banking, consumer notice and disclosure requirements in a technology
setting, the application of recently-adopted agency guidelines on the protection of
customer information and a host of other issues are of undeniable importance to
banking organizations which impose their own set of risks. Another topic not
specifically addressed herein is the disclosure of corporate information on websites
and the possible ramifications under the securities laws for posting inaccurate,
incomplete or misleading information. A third topic is the potential liability for fraud
or for consumer protection or securities law violations that could flow from including
a link to another website that posts inaccurate, incomplete or misleading information.
The authors believe that, although important, each of these topics is self-contained
and better left for separate and more fulsome treatments than possible in the article.
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system; (4) sniffing, in which a software program is inserted into a
system to search for and capture passwords as they pass through
the system; and (5) distributeddenial-of-service attacks, in which a
system is overwhelmed with a large number of bogus
communication requests, usually generated by an automatic or
repeated-dialing software program, with the intent of blocking or
disrupting legitimate traffic.'
The various modes of connectivity also carry different
degrees of convenience/risk trade-offs. Telephone banking, for
example, is reasonably safe from intrusion, because it uses a fairly
secure technology channel - standard telephone lines. However,
the range of services available through telephone banking is quite
limited, and telephone communications are still vulnerable to
identity theft and spoofing. On-line banking through personal
computers, by contrast, makes possible the delivery of a much
broader range of services and much greater convenience, because
this channel has a greater capacity for information interchange and
greater functionality. However, because electronic commerce
generally still has something of a Wild West image, on-line
banking raises questions in the minds of some customers regarding
security and reliability, and the technology is more vulnerable than
telephone banking to hacking, denial-of-service attacks and
sniffing. Some observers also are concerned that on-line banking
can facilitate money laundering activity.
Advanced information gathering, storage and processing
technology-what is commonly known as "aggregation services,"
"data warehousing" and "data mining"-is an outgrowth of
technologically sophisticated delivery channels, and presents its
own set of risks. Aggregation services and advanced data
management techniques can improve the ease and speed of
customer transaction processing, and make possible the tailoring
of products and services on demand. However, the accumulation
in one place of so much detailed information on individual
customers, and with communications technology presenting so
66. See generally
ELEC.

BANKING

BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, RISK MGMT. FOR

AND

ELEC.

MONEY

AcrIWTIES

("Risk

Management"),

http://www.bis.orglpubl/bcbs35.pdf (last updated Mar. 1998). See also, discussion
infra note 80.
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many potential entry points to that information that may be
vulnerable to intruders, the risks of compromise are considerable.
In addition, a bank that uses such advanced information
technology is exposed to substantial risk should customers not be
adequately informed of the bank's information use and protection
policies or should the information be misused or compromised.
Serving as a certificate authority is another activity that
presents its own unique risks. Many banks are considering, and a
not insignificant number have undertaken, this activity in which
the bank serves as a trusted intermediary or third-party escrow
agent for information (principally identification) encryption
services. This activity is a natural one for banks. A bank that
serves as a certificate authority can facilitate electronic commerce
transactions for its customers by leveraging its existing
relationships and its expertise as a financial intermediary.
However, a bank that engages in this type of activity is at the
mercy of its security and authorization systems, and by serving as a
certification agent takes on an added layer of risk and potential
liability.
A bank that embraces delivery channels based on advanced
technology also must address a host of administrative risks. One
set of risks comes with what might be called "back-end"
relationships. These are the issues that arise in relationships with
vendors and outsourced service providers. Because electronic
banking involves the use of new, evolving technologies that are
marked by rapid change, it frequently is beyond the capabilities of
the bank, or not a good use of bank resources, to support these
technologies in-house. This evolving technology leads to the
purchase of off-the-shelf systems from vendors or the use of
outsourcing to third parties to support the bank's efforts. The
vendors or outsource contractors therefore assume the role of
experts upon whom the bank relies for the proper functioning of
these systems. The vendors and contractors bear the risk of
performing as promised, and the bank bears the risk that they will
perform as promised.
Another set of risks arises in the context of mergers and
acquisitions. A bank that comes to rely heavily on sophisticated
systems and networks to connect with its customers and its
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vendors/contractors faces potentially enormous integration
problems following consummation of a merger or acquisition. It is
not uncommon for merging organizations to have incompatible
systems, and the integration of those systems can be the most
difficult task faced by the merger partners. Integration problems
carry the risks of customer inconvenience, loss of business and the
need to implement expensive fixes for the problems.
Finally, a bank that implements high-technology systems
inevitably has to deal with intellectual property issues. The use of
advanced technology generates a need for the bank to take
appropriate steps both to protect its own intellectual property
rights and to avoid infringement of others. With the rapid pace of
change in technology development and the proliferation of
systems of every kind and description, avoiding the land mines on
intellectual property becomes increasingly difficult.
3. The Impact of Risk-Based Supervision
As seen from the foregoing discussion, the nature and
multitude of risks that the Internet and other technology-based
delivery channels present for banks and other financial service
providers is daunting. It therefore is not surprising that the global
financial regulatory community has paid particular attention to the
issue of information technology risk. This focus also is entirely
consistent with the bank regulatory agencies' migration over the
past decade from largely transaction-based examinations to a riskbased supervisory approach.
Some decades ago, bank examiners would spend a
considerable, amount of examination time. counting cash in the
tellers' drawers. Over time, examiner resources were redirected to
higher-level transaction-based examination tasks, such as the
review of individual loan files and board minutes. Even that level
of micro-examination, however, had become more difficult to
justify as institutions became increasingly more sophisticated and
complex, incorporating derivatives, securities, a variety of offbalance sheet products and electronic banking into their core
businesses. As the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System ("Federal Reserve") noted in 1996:
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[A]s evolving financial instruments and markets
have enabled banking organizations to rapidly
reposition their portfolio risk exposures, it has
become clear that periodic assessments of the
condition of financial institutions based on
transaction testing alone cannot keep pace with the
moment-to-moment changes occurring in financial
risk profiles. Consequently, in order to ensure that
institutions have in place the processes necessary to
identify, measure, monitor, and control their risk
exposures, examinations and inspections have
increasingly placed a greater emphasis on evaluating
the appropriateness of such processes and had been
evolving away from a very high degree of
transaction testing. 7

As a result, risk-based supervision has assumed an
increasingly important role in the supervisory policies and
procedures adopted by banking regulators both in the U.S. and
abroad. Thus, the bank supervisory agencies have moved toward
systemic examination and supervision, with an attendant emphasis
on the identification of risk and the implementation of internal
control systems to manage that risk. Reliance on the old style of
supervision, which essentially was examination by hindsight, has
largely fallen from favor. The regulators have concluded that it
does not do much good to find problems after they have
happened, especially at a time when banks can transmit and
deploy vast sums electronically in the twinkling of an eye, or
though complex off-balance sheet devices. Risk-based supervision,
in the view of the regulators, makes for a forward-looking,
proactive supervisory program. In the United States, the Office of
the Controller of the Currency ("OCC") officially introduced its
program of "Supervision by Risk" its "Community Bank

67. Interagency Statement on The Effect of Year 2000 on Computer Systems, Fed.
Res. SR Letter 96-16, July 3, 1996, http:Ilwww.federalreserve.govboarddocsl
SRLETTERS/1996/SR9616.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2001).
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Examination Procedures for Noncomplex Banks.""
There
followed in December 1996 the OCC's release of its "Bank
Supervision Process" handbook,69 which described nine risk
categories by which the quantity and quality of risk management
could be measured." Similarly, the Federal Reserve introduced a
rating system for the adequacy of risk management processes and
internal controls in November 1995."' In November 1996, the
Federal Reserve, the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, and
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") issued the
"State/Federal Supervisory Protocol and Model Agreement,"'
which contemplates a coordinated risk-focused process of
supervision for interstate banks. And in August 1997, the Federal
Reserve issued its "Risk-Focused Framework for Supervision of
Large Complex Institutions"' and "Risk-Focused Framework for
Supervision of Community Banks."'74
4. Guidance from the Basel Committee
Consistent with the move toward risk-based supervision
generally, examination and supervision policies relating to
information technology and electronic banking activities likewise
68. THE

COMPTROLLER'S

HANDBOOK,

COMMUNITY

BANK

EXAMINATION

PROCEDURES FOR NONCOMPLEx BANKS (Oct. 1995).

69. THE COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK, BANK SUPERVISION PROCESS (Apr. 1996).
70. Id. at 18. The nine risk categories are: credit risk, interest rate risk, liquidity
risk, price risk, foreign exchange risk, transaction risk, compliance risk, strategic risk
and reputation risk.
71. Rating the Adequacy of Risk Management Processes and Internal Controls
at State Member Banks and Bank Holding Companies, Fed. Res. SR Letter 95-51
(Nov. 14,1995), http:/Iwww.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SRLETTERS/1995/
SR9551.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2001).
72 State/FederalSupervisory Protocol and Nationwide Supervisory Agreement
[Current Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 46-145 (Fed. Res. SR Letter 96-33,
Nov. 22, 1996), available at http:llwww.federalreserve.govlboarddocs/SRLETrERS/
1996/SR9633.htm (last visited Mar. 3,2001).
73. Risk-Focused Framework for Supervision of Large Complex Institutions,
[Current Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 37-748C (Fed. Res. SR Letter 97-24,
Oct. 27, 1997), available at http:llwww.federalreserve.govlboarddocs/SRLETTERS/
1997/SR9724. htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2001).
74. Risk-Focused Framework for the Supervision of Community Banks [Current
Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 37-748 (Fed. Res. SR Letter 97-25, Oct. 1,
1997), availableat http://www.federalreserve.govlboarddocs/SRLETTERS/1997/
SR9725.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2001).
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have become focused on risk assessment, monitoring and control.
Two issuances by the preeminent international bank regulatory
body, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (referred to in
this section as the "Basel Committee" or "Committee"),75 are
particularly useful in charting the development of risk-based
supervisory concepts as applied to electronic banking and
information technology.
In March 1998, the Basel Committee issued a document
entitled "Risk Management for Electronic Banking and Electronic
Money Activities. 76 In this document, one of the Committee's
first attempts to deal on a broad basis with the risks attendant to
electronic banking, the Committee stated that its purpose was to
"provide considerations for supervisory authorities and banking
organizations as they develop methods for identifying, assessing,
managing and controlling the risks associated with electronic
banking and electronic money., 77 The Committee noted that
because of rapid changes in information technology, no list of risks
involved in electronic banking activities can be exhaustive;
however, the specific risks faced by banks engaged in electronic
banking activities could, in the Committee's view, be grouped
according to the risk categories that the Committee had
established in its earlier issuances on the subject of risk
management.78 The Committee concluded that, although some
75. The Basel Committee On Banking Supervision is a committee of bank
supervisory authorities that was established in 1974 by the central bank governors of
the Group of Ten countries. The Committee comprises senior representatives of
bank supervisory authorities and central banks from Belgium, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom and the United States. It usually meets at the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) in Basel, Switzerland, and the BIS provides the
permanent Secretariat for the Committee. The Committee has had a significant
impact on bank supervisory and examination principles among the banking
authorities of its member nations, the most notable being its widely followed riskbased capital framework.
76. BASEL COMMrrrBE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 66, at 1.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 4. In its "Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision," issued in
September 1997, the Basel Committee identified eight risk categories that form the
basis of a risk-based supervisory system: credit risk, country and transfer risk, market
risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk, operational risk, legal risk and reputational risk.
The U.S. federal banking regulators largely have adopted these risk categories, with
some modifications, in the risk-based supervisory approach that they have
implemented. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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specific problems can cut across all risk categories, at that stage in
the evolution of electronic banking, operational risk, reputational
risk and legal risk may be the most important risk categories that
banks must face.79
79. See supra note 69, at 5. The Committee described "operational risk" as that
arising from the bank's potential for loss due to significant deficiencies in system
reliability or integrity. This risk can include security concerns, as banks may be
subject to external or internal attacks on their systems or products; inadequately
designed or implemented electronic banking and electronic money systems; and
customer misuse. Id.
"Reputational risk" was defined as the risk of significant negative public
opinion that results in a critical loss of funding or customers. Reputational risk may
involve actions that create a lasting negative public image of overall bank operations,
such that the bank's ability to establish and maintain customer relationships is
significantly impaired. Reputational risk may also arise if actions by the bank cause a
major loss of public confidence in the bank's ability to perform functions critical to its
continued operation. Reputational risk can arise in response to actions a bank itself
takes or in response to actions of third parties. Increased reputational risk can
directly contribute to heightened risk exposure, or problems, in other risk categories,
particularly operational risk. Id. at 7. The Committee specifically pointed out that
mistakes, malfeasance, and fraud by third parties may also expose a bank to
reputational risk. Reputational risk can arise from significant problems with
communications networks that impair customers' access to their funds or account
information, particularly if there are no alternative means of account access. Indeed,
substantial losses caused by mistakes of another institution offering the same, or
similar, electronic banking products or services may cause a bank's customers to view
its products or service with suspicion, even if the bank itself did not face the same
problems. Reputational risk may also arise from targeted attacks on a bank. For
example, a hacker penetrating a bank's web site may alter it to intentionally spread
inaccurate information about the bank or its products. Id.
The Committee said that "legal risk" arises from violations of, or nonconformance with laws, rules, regulations, or prescribed practices, or when the legal
rights and obligations of parties to a transaction are not well established. Given the
relatively new nature of many retail electronic banking activities, rights and
obligations of parties to such transactions are, in some cases, uncertain. For example,
the application of some consumer protection rules to electronic banking activities in
some countries may not be clear. In addition, legal risk may arise from uncertainty
about the validity of some agreements entered into via electronic media. Id. at 8.
The Committee also warned that banks choosing to enhance customer service by
linking their Internet sites to other sites also can face legal risks. A hacker may use
the linked site to defraud a bank customer, and the bank could face litigation from
the customer. Id.
Finally, the Committee noted that as electronic commerce expands, banks
may seek to play a role in electronic authentication systems, such as those using
digital certificates. The role of a certification authority may expose a bank to legal
risk. For example, a bank acting as a certification authority may be liable for
financial losses incurred by parties relying on the certificate. In addition, legal risk
could arise if banks participate in new authentication systems and rights and
obligations are not clearly specified in contractual agreements. Id. A digital
certificate issued by a certification authority is intended to ensure that a given digital
signature is in fact generated by a given signer. A bank that undertakes to act as a
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Although in its 1998 document the Basel Committee
demonstrated a reasonably good grasp of the issues and risks
presented by the industry's increasing involvement in electronic
banking, the breadth and sophistication of the Committee's
understanding and competence grew markedly in the two years
following release of that paper. In particular, the Committee
established an Electronic Banking Group ("EBG"), a subset of the
Committee (presently chaired by the U.S. Comptroller of the
Currency) that focuses entirely on electronic banking issues. The
EBG issued a "White Paper" in October of 2000 titled "Electronic
Banking Risk Management Issues for Bank Supervisors."8 This
paper extends the discussion begun in the 1998 document and
highlights both the rapid growth of electronic banking in the two
years since that paper was prepared. More importantly, the 2000
document evidences a much deeper understanding of the extent to
which the growth of electronic banking has implications for a
greater range of risks than had been presented in the 1998 paper.81

certification authority could be considered to be providing services to clients similar
to those associated with providing an account access device or acting as a notary
public. A digital signature is a string of data appended to an electronic message that
is intended to identify uniquely the sender to the recipient. See infra notes 175-179
and accompanying text. At present, most digital signatures are generated using a
cryptographic algorithm in which the sender uses one mathematical function to
create the signature and the receiver uses a different, but related mathematical
function to verify the signature. Digital signatures also typically provide a
mechanism for verifying the integrity of the message. BASEL COMMITTEE ON
BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 66, at 8 n.7.
80. See ELECTRONIC BANKING RISK MANAGEMENT ISSUES FOR BANK
SUPERVISORS, BASEL COMMITrEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION,

http://www.bis.orgl

publ/bcbs76.pdf (Oct. 2000). This is one of a series of White Papers prepared by the
Committee and released as part of a document titled "Electronic Banking Group
Initiatives and White Papers." Please note that Committee publications are is not
entirely consistent in references to the Committee's name ("for Banking" versus "on
Banking") or the spelling of the Committee's home city, opting for the Germanderived "Basel" in some instances and the French-derived "Basel" in others. Id.
81. Id. Section IV of the 2000 White Paper. Section IV contains an excellent
discussion of the EBG's more current assessment of risks of electronic banking.
Most significantly, the 2000 White Paper improves on the 1998 White Paper by
adding a discussion of strategic and business risks, and by providing a much more
detailed discussion of the various categories of operational risks. The discussion of
operational risks covers more specifically the risks inherent in technology,
infrastructure, security, data integrity, system availability, internal controls/audit, and
outsourcing. Id.
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5. Guidance from the U.S. Regulatory Community
The U.S. bank regulatory agencies are active participants in
the Basel Committee, and much of the analysis and guidance
contained in the Basel Committee issuances discussed above also
can be found in releases from the U.S. regulators. Indeed, the U.S.
regulators, both individually and jointly through the Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council ("FFIEC"), have been
aggressive in disseminating to their institutions handbooks,
bulletins and other forms of guidance dealing with various aspects
of electronic banking, information technology and the risks
inherent in those endeavors.
In 1996, the FFIEC issued its "Information Systems (IS)
Examination Handbook." 82 At that point, the emphasis was on
risk-based examinations of the internal processes and procedures
employed by financial institutions in their handling and use of data
and information. It was principally an inward-looking examination
program, focusing on what the FFIEC called "transaction risk
[that is,]... risks. .. associated with service or product delivery and
with providing support in... management processes."83 In more
recent issuances, the FFIEC began to deal more directly with
shared-risk issues. For example, in July 1998 the FFIEC issued its
"Guidance on Electronic Financial Services and Consumer
Compliance."84 And in November of 2000, the FFIEC got to the
heart of the matter when it published "Risk Management of
Outsourced Technology Services." 85
In addition to their coordinated efforts under the FFIEC
umbrella, each of the bank regulatory agencies has issued its own
analysis of and guidelines regarding electronic banking and
technology risks. The OCC has been the most active in this regard.
For example, the OCC published its own "Internet Banking
82. FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION
INFORMATION SYSTEMS EXAMINATION HANDBOOK (Sept. 19,

COUNCIL,

1996

1996) [hereinafter

referred to as the IS HANDBOOK].

83. Id. at 2-1.
84. FEDERAL

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, GUIDANCE ON
ELECTRONIC FINANCIAL SERVICES AND CONSUMER COMPLIANCE (July 15,1998).
85. FEDERAL FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, RISK MGMT. OF OUTSOURCED
TECH. SERVICES (Nov. 28,2000).
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Handbook" in October 1999.86 Other examples include two 1998
issuances on "Technology Risk Management;, 87 issuances in 1999
on
"Infrastructure Threats from Cyber-Terrorists '8 8 and
"Certification Authority Systems;" 89 and in 2000 on
"Infrastructure Threats - Intrusion Risks," 90 "Protecting 92Internet
91
Addresses of National Banks," and "Third-Party Risk.,
The OCC has recognized implicitly that banks, through the
increased use of technology-based delivery channels, have moved
increasingly into a shared-risk environment. This can be seen, for
example, in the OCC's
August 24, 1998 release titled "
Technology Risk Management: PC Banking." 93 In this document,
the OCC provides guidance to banks on identifying, measuring,
monitoring and controlling risks that arise from giving customers
the option to use personal computers to effect banking
transactions. In its summary of key points, the OCC notes:
PC banking can increase the level of direct
interaction between a bank's customers and its
internal networks and technology systems and can
expand the connections between public networks,
such as the Internet, and the bank's internal
systems. Without proper internal controls, these
86. OCC HANDBOOK ON INTERNET BANKING (October 1999), available at
http://vww.occ.treas.gov/handbook/intbank.pdf (last visited Mar. 4,2001).
87. Technology Risk Management, [Current Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 60-559 (OCC Bulletin 98-3, Feb. 4, 1998) [hereinafter OCC Bulletin 98-3];
Technology Risk Management - PC Banking, [Current Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 60-731 (OCC Bulletin 98-38, Aug. 4, 1998) [hereinafter OCC Bulletin 98-

38].
88. InfrastructureRisk from Cyber-Terrorists,[Current Binder] Fed. Banking L.

Rep. (CCH)

60-635 (OCC Bulletin 99-9, Mar. 5,1999).

89. Certification Authority Systems, [Current Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.

(CCH)

60-732 (OCC Bulletin 99-20, May 4,1999).

90. Infrastructure Threats - Intrusion Risks, [Current Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) 60-638 (OCC Bulletin 2000-14, May 15,2000).
91. Protecting Internet Addresses of National Banks, [Current Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 60-639 (OCC Alert 2000-9, July 19,2000).
92. Third Party Risk Analysis, [Current Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
35-521 (OCC Advisory Letter, Aug. 29, 2000). All of the OCC materials referenced

in footnotes 86 through 91 may be accessed through links found on the OCC's
"Internet Banking" web page, http://www.occ.treas.gov/netbank/ebguide.htm. (last
visited Mar. 4,2001).
93. OCC Bulletin 98-3, supra note 87, at 69,309.
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situations may create significant security concerns.
In many cases, PC banking increases a bank's reliance on
service providers and software vendors. Reliance on these third
parties requires bank management to design appropriate risk
controls for these relationships. 14
The OCC has reported that although technology oriented
bank systems are susceptible to the nine risks enumerated by the
OCC, the greatest risks come from "strategic, reputation and
compliance risk." 95
Although the OCC has perhaps been the most active of the

agencies in issuing guidance on technology issues, the other
banking agencies early on also focused on shared--risk issues. For
example, in the Information Technology section of its Regulatory
Handbook, adopted in October 1997, the Office of Thrift

Supervision ("OTS") advised its examination staff:

94. Id.
95. Id. at 69,114. The OCC found that transaction risk, the risk to earnings or
capital arising from problems with the service or product delivery, can result "from
deficiencies in system design, implementation, or ongoing maintenance of systems of
equipment" and can increase when banks merge, when banks hire outside
contractors to design systems, when banks use "vendors to perform core bank
functions," or when banks fail to establish adequate security measures, contingency
plans, testing and auditing standards. Id. at 69,115. The OCC found that strategicrisk,
the risk to earnings or capital arising from adverse business decisions or improper
implementation of those decisions, can arise "when management does not adequately
plan for, manage, and monitor the performance of technology-related products,
services, processes, and delivery channels," or "if management fails to understand,
support, or use a technology that is essential for the bank to compete or if it depends
on a technology that is not reliable." Id. at 69,116. The OCC found that reputation
risk, the risk to earnings or capital arising from negative public opinion, may arise
from "flawed security systems that significantly compromise customer privacy;
inadequate contingency and business resumption plans that affect a bank's ability to
maintain or resume operations and to provide customer services following system
failures, fraud that fundamentally undermines public trust and large-scale litigation
that exposes a bank to significant liability." Id. The OCC found that compliance risk,
the risk to earnings or capital arising from violations of or non-conformance with
laws, rules regulations, prescribed practices, or ethical standards, may arise "when a
bank does not have systems in place to ensure compliance with mandatory reporting
statutes." Id. "As banks move increasingly from paper to electronic-based
transactions and information exchanges, they need to consider how laws designed for
paper-based transactions apply to electronic-based transaction and information
exchanges." Id.
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With the increased focus of institutions on the use of
electronic channels to perform their daily operations
and offer new products and services, safety and
soundness examiners play a more important role in
evaluating an institution's risks in the use of
information technology. Whether the institution's
deployment of technology is limited to the staff's
use of stand-alone personal computers (PCs) or
includes more sophisticated applications such as
telephone or PC banking programs for customers,
the rapid pace of change in the electronic networked
environment calls for a risk-based approach to
examinations of institutions....
Regardless of the level of sophistication, risks are
inherent in all electronic capabilities. Threats can
come from both internal and external sources.
Outside hackers, disgruntled employees, and
inadvertent errors can adversely affect reliability.
For instance, an information-only World Wide Web
site used for advertising purposes may be
inappropriately altered by unauthorized parties.
Electronic mail containing confidential or
proprietary information may be distributed in error.
Networked systems that are directly connected to an
institution's main operations database might be
accessed by unauthorized parties, revealing sensitive
data."

Similarly, the Federal Reserve in 1996, in reaction to the
increasing use of computer technology, sought to benchmark
sound information security policies and practices, and issued on
December 4, 1997 Supervisory Release 97-32 (SUP), "Sound
Practices Guidelines for Information Security for Networks., 97 At

96. OTS REGULATORY HANDBOOK 341.1 (Oct. 1997).
97. Information Security For Networks - Sound Practices Guidance, [Current
Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 60-631 (Fed. Res. Bull. 97-32, Dec. 4,1997).

206

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 5

about the same time, the FDIC on December 18, 1997 issued
Financial Institution Letter 131-97, transmitting a paper entitled
"Security Risks Associated with the Internet."98 In the years
following these seminal pronouncements, all of the agencies have
continued, jointly and individually to issue further guidance on
dealing with technology-driven risks. 99
One area that calls for the particular attention of the
regulatory agencies is technology outsourcing. Because of the
increasing reliance by institutions on third-party service providers
to support their technology initiatives, the agencies through the
FFIEC issued a guidance document on November 28,2000 entitled
"Risk Management of Outsourced Technology Services."' 00 The
EFIEC notes that the use of third-party service providers can help
financial institutions manage costs, obtain necessary expertise,
expand customer product offerings, and improve services, but also
can introduce an additional set of risks for the institution. This
document provides risk-management guidance in the due diligence
process used in selecting a service provider, in addressing
contractual issues, and in conducting the oversight and monitoring
of the service provider during the term of the relationship.
Finally, to underscore the growing attention being paid to
shared-risk issues by the regulators, the interagency Suspicious
Activity Report ("SAR") was amended in June 2000 to address
technology-related issues. Financial institutions are required to file
an SAR when encountering a known or suspected violation of law
or a suspicious transaction relating to a money laundering activity
or violation of the Bank Secrecy Act. The SAR procedures now
include "Computer Intrusion" as a type of reportable "Suspicious
Activity Information.''. "Computer Intrusion" is defined in the
instructions to the SAR form as
[G]aining access to a computer system of a financial
98. Information Security System Risk - Internet, [Current Binder] Fed. Banking
Rep. (CCH)

60-634 (FIL 131-97, Dec. 18,1997).

99. A list of recent significant technology-related releases by the Basel
Committee, FFIEC, and the regulatory agencies is included as the Appendix to this
article.
100. See supra note 54.
101. SusPicious ACnrrVY REPORT (SAR) FoRM, [Current Binder] Fed. Banking
Rep. (CCH) 51-987 (SAR Bull., June 19,2000).
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institution to:
a. Remove, steal, procure or otherwise affect funds
of the institution or the institution's customers;
b. Remove, steal, procure or otherwise affect
critical information of the institution including
customer account information; or
c. Damage, disable or otherwise affect critical
systems of the institution.
For purposes of this reporting requirement,
computer intrusion does not mean attempted
intrusions of websites or other non-critical
information systems of the institution that provide
no access to institution or customer financial or
10 2
other critical information.

. III.

BANK SECURITY IN AN INFORMATION AGE

As banking becomes more complicated, bank security
becomes more complicated. Regulators are holding bank directors
and executives responsible for understanding and controlling their
banks' security infrastructure. 13 Yet security is never an absolute:
as long as a valuable prize is accessible to any person, it may
become accessible to the wrong people. The history of security is
the story of a constant struggle - featuring increasingly advanced
plans, methods and technologies - between the people holding
treasure and those wishing to take the treasure away. Each group
gains an advantage and the other reacts to the new rules of the
game. Modem day Willie Suttons will continue to attack financial
institutions with new and creative schemes, while management and
security professionals must resist and react. Furthermore, current
bank security must be concerned not only with protecting access to

102. Id.
103. Federal bank regulators clearly direct bank management to specifically
oversee information security efforts. OCC Bulletin 98-3, supra note 87; OCC Bulletin
98-38, supra note 87; Security Monitoring of Computer Networks, [Current Binder]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 60-640 (FIL 67-2000, Oct. 3,2000).
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cash by thieves, but also with maintaining customer accessibility
and public confidence. 104
These concerns broaden an organization's security mandate
so that the organization must be proactive, flexible and constantly
vigilant. Keeping people out of a bank is an easier task that
assuring that everyone can come into the bank but that only those
with permission may take money out. Today's banker must worry
about terrorists, recreational hackers, and power disruptions as

much as he worries about bank robbers.
Given these pressing demands, a bank could spend its
entire budget on security measures and still never attain complete

and certain security. Somehow, financial institutions must meet
the practical and regulatory requirements for securing their
electronic infrastructures without "breaking the bank." Financial
services regulators provide detailed guidance and recommendations on security actions that regulated institutions should
follow." 5 These guidelines are based on fundamental security
practices applicable to any complex organization. Therefore, to
understand the basis of regulatory and legal responsibilities for

electronic information security, and to find efficient and effective
104. Banks risk business losses if the public does not perceive security in the
banks' systems. For example, in a recent poll of American adults, those with Internet
access most often cited security and privacy reasons as a reason for not banking
online. Edward Morawski, Industries, Poll: Net Currency, RED HERRING, Jan. 16,
2001, available at www.redherring.conr/industries/2001/0111/ind-mag-90-banking
011101.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2001). Bank regulators find reputation risk
exposure in customer access issues. OCC Bull. 98-3, supra note 87.
Reputation risk exposure is present throughout the organization
and is why banks have the responsibility to exercise an abundance
of caution in dealing with its customers and community....
Reputation risk arises whenever technology-based banking
products, services, delivery channels, or processes may generate
adverse public opinion such that it seriously affects a bank's
earnings or impairs capital .... Adverse public opinion may create
a lasting, negative public image of overall bank operations and
thus impair a bank's ability to establish and maintain customer and
business relationships.
Id. "In a general way, [bank] supervisory authorities are asked to give a certain
nebulously defined protection to the public and the shareholders of banks, and in the
event of failure or liquidation of the bank, specifically to its depositors." Ross M.
ROBERTSON, THE COMPTROLLER AND BANK SUPERVISION,

164-165 (1968).

105. See attached Appendix (citing regulatory releases from OCC, FDIC, Federal
Reserve and OTS).
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security practices, financial service executives and their counsel
should become familiar with the security guidelines used as
standards for government and industry. Bank management can
learn the standard of care required for protecting its information
systems by learning and enacting basic information security
principles. To this end, the final section of this paper analyzes
several well-established models for securing an organization built
on networked electronic information, then proposes specific
methods for pursuing cost-effective information security.
A.

Information Security Methods and Theory

A simple and effective method of learning information
security concepts is to review relevant theoretical models. The
authors have chosen to examine the following three information
security models: (1) a bank regulatory model evinced by the FDIC
Issues Paper on Information System Security Issues1"6 and the
OCC's Technology Risk Management Guidance for Bankers and
Examiners,0 7 (2) the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices
for Securing Information Technology Systems from the National
0
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),"'
and (3) the
Information Assurance Technology Framework (IATF) from the
National Security Agency and private industry groups.109 The
following paragraphs describe similarities and differences in these
three models and discuss how the information security models may
apply to financial services companies.
Financial service regulators are charged with guiding banks
in managing and controlling risk. As demonstrated above, many
of these regulators have adopted a risk-based review of financial
106. Risk Assessment Tools and Practices for Information System Security,

[Current Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)

60-636 (FIL-68-99, July 7,1999).

107. OCC Bull. 98-38, supra note 87.
108. MARIANNE SWANSON & BARBARA GUTTMAN, GENERALLY ACCEPTED
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES FOR SECURING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS
(1996), at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs (last visited Mar. 4, 2001).

109. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY AND INFORMATION ASSURANCE SOLUTIONS,
INFORMATION ASSURANCE TECHNOLOGY FRAMEWORK, RELEASE 3.0 (Oct. 2000), at
https://wwv.iatf.net/login/framework-docs (last visited Mar. 4, 2001) (application for
free password required) [hereinafter IATF] (describing the information security
Defense-in-Depth Strategy used by the U.S. Department of Defense). Id.
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institutions, and the analysis of risk is followed by recommended
strategies for risk reduction;"' OCC 98-3 is a representative
example of these recommended strategies. In this guidance
document, the OCC takes broad strokes to paint an outline of
policies, plans and practices that may lead to reduction of security
risk. Knowing that banks of varying sizes and in varying stages of
technology development also have varying technology security
needs, 1 ' the OCC only makes general recommendations salted
with illustrative examples. The OCC does not provide safe
harbors or detailed protection plans for its regulated entities.
After first defining the relevant risks involved with banks'
growing dependence on technology, the OCC provides a
"Technology-Related Risk Management Process.""12 To follow the
OCC's recommended process, a bank must "(1) plan for its use of
technology, (2) decide how it will implement the technology, and
(3) measure and monitor risk-taking.""'
After a detailed
discussion of recommended strategies for strategic planning"14 and
project management controls," 5 the OCC specifically speaks to the
importance of security matters.11 6 The regulatory guidance offers
few specifics on information security beyond recommending fraud
prevention, management involvement and regular audits."' The
110. See, e.g., OCC Bull. 98-38, supra note 87; Information Security ForNetworks Sound Practices Guidance, [Current Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 60-631
(Fed. Res. Bull. 97-32, Dec. 4,1997).
111. See OCC Bull 98-3, supra note 93, at 6. "The process will be more complex
for larger institutions, particularly for those with major technology-related
initiatives." Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. The OCC warns that in reviewing banks it will "look to see that an
effective planning process exists, that technology is implemented properly with
appropriate controls, and that measurement and monitoring efforts effectively
identify ways to manage risk exposure." Id.
114. Id. at 6-9.
115. Id. at 9-10.
116. Id. at 10. "Bank information system security controls are particularly
important." Id. at 10.
117. Id. The entire information security statement in OCC 98-3 reads as follows:
Security measures should be clearly defined with measurable
performance standards. Responsible personnel should be assigned
to ensure a comprehensive security program. Bank management
should take necessary steps to protect mission-critical systems
from unauthorized intrusions. Systems should be safeguarded, to
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document then addresses other security-related topics in an
equally cursory manner, including brief statements on policies and
procedures, employee experience and training, measuring and
testing products and performance, contingency planning and
outsourcing."'
The FDIC issued a Financial Institution Letter discussing
information security in financial institutions. 1 9 While the body of
the letter provided general guidance to financial institution boards
of directors, including an outline of a proactive "Prevention,
Detection, Response" information security program, 2 ' the FDIC
attached an appendix addressing certain of the most important
tools and methods used to test an organization's information
protection regime.' 2' The FDIC letter analyzes risk12 2 and reviews
potential threats,2 2 but like the OCC pronouncements, it does not
the extent possible, against risks associated with fraud, negligence,
and physical destruction of bank property. Control points should
include facilities, personnel, policies and procedures, network
controls, system controls and vendors. For example, security
access restrictions, background checks on employees, separation of
duties, and audit trails are important precautions to protect system
security within the bank and with vendors. As technologies and
systems change or mature, security controls may need to change
periodically as well.
Id.
118. Id. at 10-14. For example, in the important security and risk-reduction field
of "Contingency Planning and Business Continuity" the OCC declares that "The risk
of equipment failure and human error is possible in all systems," and then describes
various types of potential system failure. While OCC 98-3 discusses "public relations
and outreach" as a part of business continuity planning, this document does not
provide guidance on the specific content of an acceptable contingency plan. Id.
119. FDIC FIN. INST. LETTER, supra note 54.
120. Id. at 1-2.
121. Id. at 6-11.
122. Id. at 3. The letter examines performance of internal security risk
assessments (including outsourcing such assessments) and assessing information
security products. The FDIC recommends "identifying mission-critical information
systems... assessing the importance and sensitivity of information, ... the likelihood
of outside break-ins (e.g., by hackers),. . .insider misuse of information,.. assessing
the risks posed by electronic connections with business partners [and] determining
legal implications and contingent liability concerns associated with any of the above."
FDIC FIN. INST. LETTER, supranote 54, at 3.
123. "Serious hackers, interested computer novices, dishonest vendors or
competitors, disgruntled current or former employees, organized crime, or even
agents of espionage pose a potential threat to an institution's computer security." Id.
The letter also warns of "social engineering... denial of service" system failure
attacks, Internet protocol spoofing, and viruses. Id. at 3-4.
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provide comprehensive or detailed advice on what actions banks
should take to protect digital information. The closest the FDIC

comes to specific advice on security methodologies is its appendix
discussing host-based and network-based vulnerability assessment
tools, 124 penetration analysis, 125 intrusion detection systems,126 and
computer incident response.127 While the FDIC does not officially
endorse these security practices, financial service institutions
would be well served to consider the FDIC's discussion as a note
of warning to consider implementing some or all of these tools as
protection for an information infrastructure.
For a bank manager to understand what these regulators
require, and to implement these broad regulatory directives, its
management should study the more detailed information security
124. Id. at 5-6. "Both host- and network-based products offer valuable features,
and the risk assessment process should help an institution determine which is best for
its needs. Information systems personnel should understand the types of tools
available, how they operate, where they are located, and the output generated from
the tools." Id. at 5.
125. Id. at 6. Penetration analysis "can apply to any institution with a network, but
becomes more important if system access is allowed via an external connection such
as the Internet." The FDIC also warns that a penetration analysis "itself can
introduce new risks to an institution," and recommends in-depth analysis of the
reputation of a consultant hired to do such testing (including review of liability
insurance, security clearance and confidentiality agreements), recommends informing
key individuals prior to a penetration test, and recommends that some systems may
be too critical to expose to such testing at all. Id.
126. Id. Intrusion detection systems "act as a burglar alarm, reporting potential
intrusions to appropriate personnel. By analyzing the information generated by the
systems being guarded, [intrusion detection systems] help determine if necessary
safeguards are in place and are protecting the system as intended... [and] they can be
configured to automatically respond to intrusions." Id. The FDIC goes on to discuss
the relative merits of intrusion detection systems including software sniffer agents on
networks and host-based audit products, but does not endorse any one system for use
in a financial institution. Id. at 6-7.
127. Id. at 9. The FDIC observes that current tools allow for real-time monitoring
of system intrusions and therefore automatic and immediate response.
When determining an appropriate response, a distinction should
be made between incidents in which actual changes to a system are
suspected (e.g. changing audit logs) versus incidents in which
system misuse is suspected (e.g. unauthorized system access).
Attempts to actually change the system or data may warrant
notifying a security officer, who could reconfigure the identified
weakness and/or communication paths. An appropriate response
to system misuse may include automatic log-off, warning messages,
or notifying the appropriate personnel.
Id. at 9.

2001]

BANK SECURITY STRATEGY

models written for security professionals in government and across
all industries. For example, the National Institute of Standards
and Technology128 has issued a relevant document titled
"Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Securing
Information Technology Systems. ' 129 Like the financial service
regulators, the NIST provides some broad principles in this
document that "address computer security from a very high-level
viewpoint," and are to be used "when developing computer
security programs and policy and when creating new systems,
practices or policies., 130 The NIST document describes eight
general principles for computer security:
1. computer security supports the mission of the
organization;
2. computer security is an integral element of
sound management;
3. computer security should be cost effective;
4. system owners have security responsibilities
outside own organizations;
5. computer security responsibilities and
accountability should be made explicit;
6. computer security requires a comprehensive and
integrated approach;
7. computer security should be periodically
reassessed; and
8. computer security is constrained by societal
131
factors.
Such overarching security platitudes, while valid, have limited use
in planning information protection regimes.
128. The National Institute of Standards and Technology is a one hundred year
old agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce's Technology Administration.
NIST is charged with working with industry to develop and apply technology,
measurements and standards. NIST sponsors the Malcolm Baldridge Quality
Awards, the U.S. Measurements and Standards Laboratories, and an Advanced
Technology Program. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY,
at http://www.nist.gov/public-affairs/general2.htm (last visited Mar. 4,2001).
129. See SwANsoN & GurrMAN, supra note 108.
130. Id. at 1. "Principles are expressed at a high level, encompassing broad areas,
e.g., accountability, cost effectiveness, and integration." Id.
131. Id. at iii.
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However, the NIST security recommendations do not leave
the interested student hanging in the ether. NIST provides very
specific current practices to "guide organizations on the types of
controls, objectives and procedures that comprise an effective IT
security program. '
The security practices identified by NIST
range from creating a protection policy to administration and
staffing, from physical and environmental security to contingency
planning. 33 While space does not permit a complete analysis of
the NIST security practices, two important security topics are
highlighted here.
First, the NIST document includes a helpful short
discussion of information technology life cycle planning.1 34 NIST
recommends that organizations develop a security plan to ensure
that security is considered throughout the entire life cycle of an
information technology system, including an assessment of the
sensitivity of information to be processed on the system. 35 As an
organization acquires, designs or programs the system, security
requirements should be written into the initial specifications. The
organization should be monitoring for threats that may arise in the
development phase like "Trojan horses, 36 incorrect code, poorly
132. Swanson and Guttman state that,
The practices show what should be done to enhance or measure an
existing computer security program or to aid in the development of
a new program. The practices provide a common ground for
determining the security of an organization and build confidence
when conducting multi-organizational business... Organizations
should use the practices as a starting point in order to develop
additional practices based on their own organizational and system
requirements.
Id. at 1-2.
133. Id. at 11-54. The NIST authors discuss security practices in the following
categories: Policy, Program Management, Risk Management, Technology Life Cycle
Planning, PersonnellUser Issues, Preparing for Contingencies and Disasters,
Computer Security Incident Handling, Awareness and Training, Security
Considerations in Computer Support and Operations, Physical and Environmental
Security, Identification and Authentication, Logical Access Control, Audit Trails,
and Cryptography. Id. at iv.
134. Id. at 22-26.
135. Id. at 22.
136. This term is well defined in Ford and Baum's discussion of planting:
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functioning development tools, manipulation of code, and
malicious insiders." 3 7 During the implementation phase, when a
system is installed and tested, NIST recommends initial system
security testing 38 and formal accreditation.139 The next technology
life cycle phase is the operation/maintenance phase which should
include standard security administration activities,140 operational
assurance and continual audits.4
In the final phase of an
information technology system life cycle (which NIST calls
"disposal phase"), the organization disposes of information,
hardware and software. NIST warns that in this phase the
organization must follow legal records retention rules and must
archive or move encrypted information. The organization should

Usually as a follow-up to a system penetration or authorization
violation attack, an intruder leaves behind a planted capability to
perpetrate or aid future attacks. Variations include Trojan Horse:
Software which outwardly has a legitimate purpose but which,
when executed, compromises the security of the user. An example
of a Trojan horse is a screen-saver that, while creating a pretty
screen image, surreptitiously scans a PC's memory and disk files
for character strings formatted as credit card numbers and sends
all such strings to an external network address accessible by the
attacker.
WARWICK & MICHAEL S. BAUM, SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: BUILDING THE
INFRAsTRucrTURE FOR DIGITAL SIGNATURES AND ENCRYPTION 96 (2nd ed., 2001).
137. SWANSON & GUTrMAN, supra note 108, at 22-23.
138. Experts note that:
System security testing includes both the testing of the particular
parts of the system that have been developed or acquired and the
testing of the entire system. Security management, physical
facilities, personnel, procedures, the use of commercial or in-house
services (such as networking services), and contingency planning
are examples of areas that affect the security of the entire system,
but may have been specified outside of the development or
acquisition cycle.
Id. at 23-24.
139. Id.
140. "Performing backups, holding training classes, managing cryptographic keys,
keeping up with user administration and access privileges, and updating security
software are some examples." Id. at 24.
141. NIST describes the standard security audit techniques as Automated Tools
(including "(1) active tools, which find vulnerabilities by trying to exploit them, and
(2) passive tests, which only examine the system and infer the existence of problems
from the state of the system"), Internal Controls Audit, Security Checklists (or
"baselines"), and Penetration Testing (attempting a system break-in, preferably
conducted with the consent and knowledge of the system manager). Id. at 25.
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also consider long-term storage of cryptographic keys. 142 Media
143
should be sanitized before the organization disposes of it.
Clearly, security risks abound in all phases of a system's life cycle,
and financial services companies will not meet their regulatory
dictates without choosing practices to address each of the threats
described above.
As a second example of specific security practices, this
paper describes NIST's treatment of user authentication for access
to electronic systems. According to NIST, "Identification and
Authentication" is a "technical measure that prevents
unauthorized people (or unauthorized processes) from entering an
[information technology] system.' ' 144 User identification, "the
means by which a user provides a claimed identity to the system,"
should include a unique identifier for every user, internal
correlation of users to their actions within the system, and
14
disabling of inactive users. 1
The second part of assuring someone's identity online is

142. The organization must also remember to store the access methods for
retrieving and using these keys. Id. at 26.
143. Swanson and Guttman point out that,
The removal of information from a storage medium (such as hard
disk or tape) is called sanitization. Different kinds of sanitization
provide different levels of protection. A distinction can be made
between clearing information (rendering it unrecoverable by
keyboard attack) and purging (rendering information
unrecoverable against laboratory attack). There are three general
methods of purging media: overwriting, deguassing (for magnetic
media only) and destruction.
SWANSON & GUTrMAN, supra note 108, at 26.

144. Id. at 43.
Identification and Authentication is a critical building block of
computer security since it is the basis for most types of access
control and for establishing user accountability .... Access control
usually requires that the system be able to identify and
differentiate among users. For example, access control is often
based on least privilege, which refers to the granting to users of
only those accesses minimally required to perform their duties.
User accountability requires the linking of activities on an
[information technology] system to specific individuals and,
therefore, requires the system to identify users.
Id.
145. Id. at 43.
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authentication. User authentication is the means to establish the
validity of access to a system.'46 To operate a secure network,
users should be required to authenticate their identities (usually
with a single log-in to the system). An organization wishing to
secure its network should secure transmission of this data over
public or shared networks, 47 should make the display of
authentication data as it is entered, and should limit the number of
log-in attempts for any user ID. 48 If an organization has chosen to
use passwords for authentication, it should change those passwords
frequently, should carefully specify the characters used for the
password, 149 and should train users on secure treatment of
passwords. User training and administration are vital where an
organization chooses more advanced forms of authentication like
digital certificates or biometric devices. ° The specificity provided
by the NIST security practices helps clarify proper methods of
securing information systems.
Another information security model is provided by the U.S.
National Security Agency and its private industry partners in the
Information Assurance Technical Framework (IAFT or
146. Swanson and Guttman point out that,
There are three means of authenticating a user's identity which can
be used alone or in combination:something the individual knows (a
secret - e.g., a password, Personal Identification Number (PIN), or
cryptographic key); something the individual possesses (a token e.g., an ATM card or a smart card); and something the individual is
(a biometric - e.g., characteristics such as a voice pattern,
handwriting dynamics, or a fingerprint).
Id. at 44.
147. Experts have stated that,
When authentication data, such as a password, is transmitted to an
[information technology] system, it can be electronically
monitored. This can happen on the network used to transmit the
password or on the [information technology] system itself. Simple
encryption of a password that will be used again does not solve this
problem because encrypting the same password will create the
same ciphertext; the ciphertext becomes the password.
Id.
148. SWANSON & GuTrMAN, supra note 108, at 44.
149. "Secure password attributes such as minimum length of six [characters],
inclusion of special characters, not being in an online dictionary, and being unrelated
to the user ID should be specified and required." Id. at 45.
150. Id.
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Framework). 51 The IATF was written to provide "technical
guidance for protecting United States (U.S.) Government and
industry
information
and
information
infrastructures."
"Information assurance relies on the people, the operations,and the
technology to accomplish the mission/business and to manage the
technology/information infrastructure.' ' 52
The IATF is an
intricately detailed document, first defining information
infrastructure, describing the Defense-in-Depth information
assurance strategy, and explaining the highly technical aspects of
security engineering, technical countermeasures, network defense,
perimeter defense and supporting infrastructure." 3 Any bank
manager, security professional or attorney interested in
understanding current regulatory and legal standards for
information security can gain insight from the entire IATF
document. The following paragraphs focus only on the Defensein-Depth strategy highlighted there. The minutia of Public Key
Infrastructure, Virtual Private Networks and Electronic Enclave
Boundaries are important to protecting complex shared-risk
information systems, but are beyond the scope of this paper.
The Framework is built around a U.S. Department of
Defense led strategy initiative called Defense-in-Depth. "The
underlying principles of this strategy are applicable to any
5 4
information system or network, regardless of organization.'
Defense-in-Depth is a layered security strategy built around the
following aspects of an organization: 1) the training, awareness,

151. IATF, supra note 109.
152- Id. at iii. (Forward by Cynthia Frederick, IATF Technical Director). The
IATF is intended for system security engineers, security customers, scientists and
researchers, commercial product and service providers and standards bodies and
consortia. Id. § 1.2.
153. Id. §§ 2.1.1-.4.
The IATF not only describes the Defense-in-Depth
Objectives, but also addresses: 1) An information system security engineering process
including systems acquisition, risk management, technology life-cycle support and
certification; 2) Technical security countermeasures including multi-level strategies,
interoperability framework, and considerations for a public key infrastructure; 3)
Defending the network, including availability of backbone networks, wireless
network security, virtual private networks and secure voice communication; 4)
Defending the enclave boundary, including firewalls, remote access, and malicious
code protection; 5) Defending the computing environment and 6) Information
assurance for the tactical environment. Id. §§ 1.1-9.11.
154. Id. § 1.4.
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physical security, personnel security and system security
administration of an organization's people; 2) the framework,
security criteria, acquisition, risk assessment, certification and
accreditation of an organization's technology; 3) and the
assessments, monitoring, intrusion detection, warning, response
and reconstitution of an organization's operations.155 The strategy
is built to protect information in complex organizational structures
while allowing access to information. The framework document
states:
The dominant need of the user community is ready
access to the information and information
infrastructure needed to support their operational
objectives.
This requires the use of robust
information processing technology and reliable
connectivity. [Information assurance] enables these
capabilities by providing organizations with the
capacity to maintain adequate protection of their
156
information.
The technology aspect of Defense-in-Depth concentrates
around four focus areas: (1) Defending the Computing
Environment; (2) Defending the Enclave Boundary; (3) Defending
the Network and Infrastructure; and (4) Supporting
57
Infrastructures.1
An organization's computer users must be required to
protect their internal servers and system applications, or
"This includes Identification and
Computing Environment.
155. Id.
Of the three principal aspects of this strategy, the IATF focuses on
technology and on providing overlapping layers of protection
against cyber threats. By this approach, a successful attack against
one layer or type of protection does not result in the compromise
of the entire information infrastructure. Other policies,
procedures, and frameworks are focused on addressing the people
and operations aspects of a Defense-in-Depth strategy.
Id.
156. Id. § 2.1
157. IATF,supra note 109, §§ 2.1.1 -. 4.
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Authentication, access control, confidentiality, data integrity, and
non-repudiation services for the variety of legacy and emerging
applications within system high environments."' 58 Defending the
Enclave Boundary is the electronic version of the ageless strategy
of perimeter defense. It means protecting an organization's
information infrastructure from intrusion as the organization's
private network connects to public or shared networks.5 9 An
organization is Defending the Network and Infrastructure
Objectives when it protects information from unintentional
disclosure or alteration. 6 "Supporting infrastructure components
are needed to be able to detect and respond such as intrusion
detection systems, audit, configuring the system, or collecting data
needed for an investigation.' 161 While the IATF concentrates on
the technology aspects of information security and only skims the
surface of the personnel and operational aspects, the Framework's
detailed layering of security and strong cryptographic elements
give insight into methods and practices for keeping financial
institution information secure.
Each of the security models examined above provides
guidance to bank management seeking to improve information
security in a shared-risk system. By studying differences in the
security models a manager can learn what each authoring body
feels is most important in creating a security system. By studying
158. Id. at § 2.1.1. Objectives in Computing Environment security include
ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of data, defending against unauthorized use
of client and server, and ensuring adequate defenses against subversive acts of trusted
people and systems. Id.
159. Id. at § 2.1.2. Objectives in keeping intruders out of an organization's
network include enabling "dynamic throttling of services in response to changing
threats," providing "a risk-managed means of selectively allowing essential
information to flow across the enclave boundary," and providing strong
authentication for access control. Id.
160. Id. at § 2.1.3. When defending network and infrastructure objectives, the
organization should assure that ali information is protected from disclosure to anyone
gaining unauthorized access to the network, should protect user traffic from outside
traffic flow analysis, and should "ensure protection mechanisms do not interfere with
otherwise seamless operation with other authorized backbone and enclave
networks." Id.
161. Id. at § 2.1.4. An organization assuring supporting infrastructure should
"provide a cryptographic infrastructure that supports key, privilege, and certificate
management and that enables positive identification of individuals using network
services" and should "plan execution and reporting requirements for contingencies
and reconstitution." Id.

2001]

BANK SECURITY STRATEGY

similarities the manager can draw conclusions about choosing
priorities for protection of an electronic banking network and the
information it contains. The final section of this paper reviews
some of these conclusions and their applicability to financial
services organizations.
B.

Allocating Resources for Information Protection

No organization can afford to throw money into a pit of
unnecessary and inadequate security measures. Instead, all
financial services organizations must find a way to meet the
regulatory mandates and sensible business practices of strong
information security by spending on the most effective
protections.162 The security models examined in the last section
suggest that financial service companies should protect their
information by developing careful security plans, by adopting
authenticated, redundant infrastructure security, and by training
people to value security.
Business security is a process, not a destination. As
discussed above, no accessible assets are absolutely secure. A
security team plans for defense, prepares technology to repel
intrusions and avoid accidents, trains people to protect their own
information, plans for disaster recovery, and remains constantly
vigilant. Creating and following a well-considered and flexible
security plan eases the process. Each of the security models
reviewed in the previous section emphasizes planning as a primary
element of strong information protection. When creating an
information security plan, first map your organization's
vulnerabilities. Where do you keep the crown jewels of your
business information? Where is your network connected to the
Internet? Where is it connected to your vendors' networks? Who
162. Simson Garfinkle comments regarding web security:
Web security is not 'all or nothing' - security is a matter of degree.
The more security measures you employ, the more you reduce
your risk. Your goal should be to reduce risk as much as practical
(and affordable), and then to take additional measures so that if
there is a security incident, you will be able to recover quickly.
SIMSON GARFINKLE, WEB SECURITY AND COMMERCE (1997), at 24.
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in your organization needs access to which information? Should
your customers have access to the same information your
employees see?
Next, choose strategies such as those described in the NIST
practices or the IAFT for reducing these vulnerabilities. 163 Budget
for the number and types of people and equipment needed to meet
your design. Plan to provide more security where it will help the
most, like perimeter choke points in your network, and less
security in less vulnerable locations, like systems that are only
accessed internally or basic office applications. Expect your
security needs to change as your business changes and as
technology progresses, so build flexibility into your plan. Online
services and connectivity are continuing to grow, further
complicating security, so plan for your security budget to grow,
even if your business is not growing.
Finally, plan for
contingencies and disasters, so that your business can recover
quickly should harm befall your information system.
A second lesson learned from the information security
models is that a complex organization can benefit from an
authenticated redundant information security architecture. This
architecture is divided into a network layer, an application layer
and system security.
What technology should protect the
communication of data from one network system to another (your
"network layer")?' 64 Safeguards for the network layer typically
include tools and policies that promote authentication and
integrity, confidentiality and access control.16 1 What should
protect the programs running on servers and personal computers,
163. For example, multi-layered security systems, public key infrastructure and
other cryptographic protections, or penetration analysis and testing.
164. FORD & BAUM, supra note 136, at 144. The authors note:
If an end system is connected directly to the Internet without

[appropriate network security measures, any packet of data it
receives potentially] may have been modified in transit, may not be
from the source from which it appears to come, and may be part of
a deliberate attack upon the system, [including penetration and
denial-of-service attacks]. Also any packet sent [potentially] may
not go where it is addressed, may get modified en route, and may
be read by unknown people or systems.

Id.
165. Id. at 142-143.
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like email, document management, or payment system software
(your "application layer")?166 Application-layer security can
include authentication, access control, confidentiality, data
integrity, and non-repudiation. 67
Current security trends favor application-level security over
network-level security, 68 but many organizations prefer a multitiered approach for more robust protection.1 69 Multi-tiered
protection may even be the most cost-effective solution. 17' The
IATF document stated:
Infonnation infrastructures are complicated systems
with multiple points of vulnerability. To address
this, the IATF has adopted the use of multiple
[information assurance] technology solutions within
the fundamental principle of the Defense-in-Depth
strategy, that is, using layers of [information
assurance] technology solutions to establish an
adequate [information assurance] posture. Thus, if
one protection
mechanism is successfully
penetrated, others behind it offer additional
protection.
Adopting a strategy of layered
protections does not imply that [information
assurance] mechanisms are needed at every possible
point in the network architecture. By implementing

166. Id. at 145.
Some application[-layer] security services constitute an alternative
to or a duplication of network[-layer] security services. [For
example, application-layer encryption of messages between a Web
browser and a Web server might achieve the same result as
encryption of the traffic at the network (IP) layer]. However,
many applications have special security requirements that just
cannot be satisfied by network-layer security.
Id.
167. Id. at 146.
168. Id.
169. IATF, supra note 109, at § 1.4.1.
170. Id. "[A] layered strategy permits application of lower assurance solutions
when appropriate, which may be lower in cost. This approach permits the judicious
application of higher assurance solutions at critical areas (e.g., network boundaries)."
Id.
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appropriate levels of protection in key areas, an
effective set of safeguards can be tailored according
to each organization's unique needs."'
What methods should be used to provide protection of a
particular end system and its local environment (your "system
security")? 72 The best-known system security attack involves
exploitation of known weaknesses in software products.173 System
security safeguards include downloading software only from
reliable sources, managing system passwords, and auditing system
penetrations. 74
In today's technical environment, authentication generally
means more than use of a personal identification number (PIN)
and password. Identification systems generally rely on something
the user knows (PIN and password), something the user has
("tokens" like access cards or smart cards), or the identity of the
user (biometrics, like fingerprint, handwriting, or voice image). 7
With the rapid commercialization of digital certificates (also called
digital signatures), 76 public key cryptography is emerging as an
important electronic tool for identification and authentication.
Digital certificates improve any of the methods of identification.
A brief description of public key cryptography may be helpful.'77
171. Id. § 1.4.1.
172. "Historically, most system damage attributed to Internet-originated attacks
could have been averted through adequate attention to system security." FORD &
BAUM, supra note 136, at 147.
173. See id. at 315-403 (describing non-repudiation and digital certificate
practices); MICHAEL S. BAUM & HENRY H. PERRITr, JR., ELECTRONIC
CONTRACTING, PUBLISHING, AND EDI LAw 208-209 (1991) (discussing notary

authentication); Id. at 197-207 (discussing security standards).
174. FoRD & BAUM, supra note 136, at 146-47.
175. GARFINKLE, supra note 162, at 105-107. In addition, Garfinkle writes that
"some companies are developing authentication systems based on Global positioning
System[s]," authenticating a user by the user's location. Id. at 107.
176. This is not to be confused with the legal term of art for "electronic signature"
as it is used in the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act or
other similar electronic commerce enabling statutes. Pub. L. No. 106-299, 114 Stat.
464, 465-473 (2000). These laws tend to broadly define an electronic signature as any
recordable sign of assent that is independent of any specific technology solution like
cryptographic digital certificates.
177. For a business-level discussion of digital certificates and public key
cryptography see GARFINKLE, supra note 162, at 101-249; FORD & BAUM, supra note
132, at 181-285; IATF, supra note 109, § 8.1.
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Digital certificates use cryptrographic algorythms called "keys" to
authenticate identity. Each user of a digital certificate creates two
keys: the user signs his message (e.g., email, document, or
transaction order) with a private key, which the user keeps to
himself, and can use to prove his identity; the user widely
distributes his public key, which is applied by others to verify the
user's certificate. As an example, a friend holds a copy of the
user's public key. The friend sends the user message and asks him
to certify it with his private key and send it back. When the friend
receives the message back, she verifies the certification with the
public key and then she knows that she is corresponding with the
person that sent her the public key (presumably the user). To
protect a private key, it can be encrypted and stored on a
computer hard disk (this method is used by Netscape Navigator
and the famous PGP program), it could be stored on a removable
floppy disk or CD-ROM for greater security, or for even stronger
protection it can be stored on a smart card. 178 A Public Key
Infrastructure uses digital certificates to allow a trusted third party
to vouch for the user's identity. 7 9 Financial service companies
should be examining the use of digital certificates and a public key
infrastructure to authenticate users and help secure basic financial
transactions.
Just as Willie Sutton and John Dillinger reached the bank's
money through its employees, the weakest information security
link at many of today's banks are users of the bank's technology.
Companies have learned the effectiveness of training employees to
respect security and building policies and procedures to enhance
security. If a company chooses to use digital certificates, it must
create a digital certificate policy.18 Financial services companies
are required to post and follow customer privacy policies.181 Banks
should also be concerned with more basic security guidelines like
those addressing use and regular changing of access passwords,
document and email retention, Internet proxy servers, opening
documents sent by email, and locked screen savers. Bank policies
178. GARFINKLE, supra note 162, at 108-110.
179. Id. at 112; FoRD & BAUM, supra note 136, at 193-314.
180. DigitalSignature Guidelines, 1996 A.B.A. SEc. OF Sci.
181. See supra note 65.
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should also limit network access of consultants and contractors,
and limit the number of vendors with direct connections into bank
systems.
IV. CONCLUSION

Banks have always attracted crooks and embezzlers
because they held a great reward. Today's financial service
companies have more threats to guard against and infinitely more
complicated systems to secure. Digital money and other valuable
digitized information call for a higher and more complex level of
protection from financial services companies. Financial regulators
have confirmed these new priorities. However, current bank
managers can meet their protection obligations in the new
environment by understanding current information security
priorities, and can afford to meet their obligations if they plan well,
implement effective authenticated, redundant systems, and
prepare their people and policies to enhance information security.
Banks may never stop a determined Willie Sutton, but by
managing their security risks, banks can remain trusted holders of
the public money.
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V. APPENDIX

Significant Regulatory Releases on Bank Technology Issues
(Available on Web Sites as Noted)
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (http://www.bis.org)

October 2000:

Electronic Banking Group Initiatives and
White Papers

March 1998:

Risk Management for Electronic
Banking and Electronic Money Activities

Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
(http://www.ffiec.gov)
November 28,2000:

Risk Management of Outsourced
Technology Services

July 15,1998:

Interagency Guidance on Electronic
Financial Services and Consumer
Compliance

September 1996

FFIEC Information Systems
Examination Handbook

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(http://www.occ.treas.gov)
January 2001:

Comptroller's Corporate Manual - The
Internet and the National Bank Charter
Handbook

January 17, 2001

Release 2001-4: Interagency Guidelines
Establishing Standards For Safeguarding
Customer Information (issued jointly
with Federal Reserve, FDIC and OTS)
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November 11, 2000

Advisory Letter 2000-12: Risk
Management of Outsourcing
Technology

July 7, 2000

Alert 2000-9: Protecting Internet
Addresses of National Banks

May 15,2000

OCC 2000-14: Infrastructure Threats Intrusion Risks

February 11, 2000

Alert 2000-1: Internet Security:
Distributed Denial of Service Attacks

October 1999

Comptroller's Handbook - Internet
Banking

September 27, 1999

OCC 99-35: Interim Rule on Electronic
Delivery of Disclosures

May 4, 1999

OCC 99-20: Certification Authority
Systems

May 4, 1999

Advisory Letter 99-6: Guidance to
National Banks on Web Site Privacy
Statements

March 5, 1999

OCC 99-9: Infrastructure Threats from
Cyber-Terrorists

August 24, 1998

OCC 98-38: Technology Risk
Management: PC Banking

February 4, 1998

OCC 98-3: Technology Risk
Management

November 19, 1997

Advisory Letter 97-9: Reporting
Computer Related Crimes
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Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(http://www.federalreserve.Lov):
November 30,2000

SR 00-17 (SPE): Guidance on the Risk
Management of Outsourced Technology
Services

February 29, 2000

SR 00-4 (SUP): Outsourcing of
Information and Transaction Processing

February 29, 2000

SR 00-3 (SUP): Information Technology
Examination Frequency

March 31, 1999

SR 99-8 (SUP): Uniform Rating System
for Information Technology (with
attached FFIEC January 20, 1999
release)

April 20, 1998

SR 98-9 (SUP): Assessment of
Information Technology in the RiskFocused Frameworks for the
Supervision of Community Banks and
Large Complex Banking Organizations

December 4, 1997

SR 97-32 (SUP): Sound Practices
Guidance for Information Security for
Networks

November 6, 1997

SR 97-28 (ENF): Guidance Concerning
the Reporting of Computer-Related
Crimes by Financial Institutions
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Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (http://www.fdic.gov)
November 9, 2000

FIL-77-2000: Bank Technology Bulletin

November 2,2000

FIL-72-2000: Electronic Signatures in
Global and National Commerce Act

October 3, 2000

FIL-67-2000: Security Monitoring of
Computer Networks

September 21, 2000

FIL-63-2000: Online Banking

December 20, 1999

FIL-113-99: Financial Institution Web
Site Privacy Survey

July 7, 1999

FIL-68-99: Risk Assessment Tools and
Practices for Information System
Security

August 17, 1998

FIL-86-98: Electronic Commerce and
Consumer Privacy

July 16, 1998

FIL-79-98: Electronic Financial Services
and Consumer Compliance

October 8, 1996

FIL-82-96: Risks Involving Client/Server
Computer Systems

August 6, 1996

FIL-59-96: Stored Value Card and Other
Electronic Payment Systems
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Office of Thrift Supervision (http://www.ots.treas.gov)
June 10, 1999

CEO Memorandum 99-109:
Transactional Web Sites

November 30, 1998

Final Rule on Electronic Operations

July 23, 1998

CEO Letter 90: Interagency Guidance on
Electronic Financial Services and
Consumer Compliance

December 23, 1997

CEO Letter 75: Guidance Concerning
the Reporting of Computer-Related
Crimes by Financial Institutions

October 15, 1997

OTS Thrift Activities Handbook, Section
341: Information Technology

June 23, 1997

Memorandum to Chief Executive
Officers: Guidance to Thrifts on Retail
On-line PC Banking

October 24, 1996

Memorandum to Chief Executive
Officers: Risk Management of Client
Server Systems

232

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 5

